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DIVERSITY'S DIVERGENCE: A POST­
GRUTTER EXAMINATION OF RACIAL 
PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
LORIN J. LAPIDus* 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Odyssey, Homer wrote, 
I, she said, was to listen to thern, but you rnust tie me 
hard in hurtful bonds, to hold rne fast in position 
upright against the rnast, with the ropes' ends fastened around it; 
but if I supplicate you and implore you to set rne 
free, then you rnust tie rne fast with even rnore lashings. 
So they sang, in sweet utterance, and the heart within me 
desired to listen, and I signaled my cornpanions to set me 
free, nodding with rny brows, but they leaned on and rowed hard 
1 
In these famous lines, the self-constraint Odysseus imposes on him­
self with the collective agreement of his shipmates reflects a distinct 
sense of rationality and pre-commitment in the face of a future that 
is unpredictable and dangerous. This is the essence of American 
constitutional jurisprudence. Just as Odysseus had his hands bound 
to the mast, we are bound to the rule of law as embodied in the 
United States Constitution. 
To many, the Republic's constitutional commitment to the text 
and manifest purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Pro­
tection Clause, which is to eliminate intentional racial discrimina­
tion, was fundamentally challenged by the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Gruffer v. Bollinger.2 This long anticipated deci­
* B.A. New York University, J.D. Wake Forest University School of Law, LL.M. 
The George Washington University Law School. Lorin Lapidus is an attorney from 
Raleigh, North Carolina. The author dedicates this article in loving memory of his 
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1. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 189-90 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper 
Row 1977). 
2. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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sion opened an ominous gateway to a postmodern legal order 
where de jure racial discrimination has become institutionalized in 
a new form and with a new name, at least within the peripatetic 
haven of university life. Grutter has established the concept of ra­
cial diversity as a compelling state interest in public education. Fol­
lowing the Grutter decision, it is possible that the diversity rationale 
could reach into other areas of law, such as public employment. 
The likelihood of the diversity rationale extending into the 
public employment context, as well as a critique of the diversity 
justification itself, is the central focus of this article. Part I describes 
the socio-political history of affirmative action in the United States 
from the Republic's inception through the modern era. Part II 
traces the constitutional trajectory of racial preferences in the edu­
cational context, culminating with Grutter v. Bollinger in 2003. Part 
III discusses the important trends in the pre-Grutter line of reme­
dial affirmative action cases in the public employment context. Part 
IV examines the case law from the federal district and appellate 
courts that have applied Grutter in the public employment context. 
Finally, Part V offers predictions regarding the expansion of Grut­
ter's diversity rationale into public employment and evaluates 
whether the diversity rationale is appropriate in the public employ­
ment context. This article concludes that a close reading of Grutter 
v. Bollinger and the initial approaches taken by the lower federal 
courts indicates that it is unlikely the diversity rationale will extend 
far into the public employment context. The article argues that this 
result is entirely appropriate and consistent with the nation's socio­
economic and moral traditions. 
I. THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL BACKDROP OF 

INSTITUTIONALIZED RACIAL PREFERENCES 

The U.S. Constitution as first ratified in 1787 was a color-con­
scious document. For example, African slaves were not recognized 
citizens for representation purposes. Rather, a slave was counted as 
"three fifths" of a person.3 Stripped of personhood and citizenship, 
a slave was constitutionally protected property. The 1787 Constitu­
tion further provided, 
No person held to service or Labour in one state, under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law 
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or La­
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, d. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
201 2006] DIVERSITY'S DIVERGENCE 
bour, but shall be delivered upon Claim of the Party to whom 
such Service or Labor may be due."4 
The importation of slaves was permitted until 1808.5 
The Republic's endorsement of slavery served as a barrier to 
national unity and tarnished the enlightenment principles of the 
Declaration of Independence.6 While tenets of dual federalism 
may have been the articulated rationale for the secession of South 
Carolina in 1861, the institution of slavery served as the catalyst for 
the Civil War.7 The constitutional protection and displacement of 
civil liberties based on an individual's race nearly caused the physi­
cal destruction of the Union. 8 
With the legal institution of slavery prohibited by the Thir­
teenth Amendment in 1865, the Republic made a conscious deci­
sion to amend the Constitution to ensure that no state may "deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."9 
The primary goal of the Fourteenth Amendment was to create a 
framework for governance that no longer recognized race as a legit­
imate means of distributing constitutional burdens and benefits.1O 
Despite the new Amendment, discrimination continued to emanate 
through southern life. Jim Crow laws intentionally discriminated 
against the newly freed slaves by disallowing material integration 
into general society.11 Blacks were disenfranchised by the imposi­
tion of insurmountable barriers, such as the grandfather clause and 
the literacy test for suffrage,12 Thus, violation of constitutional pro­
tections and displacement of civil liberties on the basis of an indi­
vidual's race continued. However, while this color-consciousness 
did not cause the physical destruction of the Union, it did, perhaps 
more harmfully, result in the moral destruction of Fourteenth 
4. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST.. amend. XIV. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, repealed in 1808. 
6. 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITs ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 241 (7th ed. 1991). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
10. See id. 
11. KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 146-47 
(1989). 
12. Id. Both the literacy test and grandfather clause operated to greatly reduce if 
not practically eliminate the ability of the newly freed slaves to vote. Id. While literacy 
tests required potential voters to read sections of fairly esoteric historical or literary 
material, the grandfather clause mandated that, to qualify as a voter, a potential voter's 
grandfather must have been a registered voter. Id. 
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause by failing to safeguard the 
very principle it was created to advance. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court adopted the color-con­
scious ideology with its approval of the separate-but-equal doctrine 
in Plessy v. FergusonP Despite this constitutional setback, Justice 
John Marshall Harlan offered a glimmer of hope in his dissenting 
opinion when he articulated his disapproval of the protection of 
rights based on race.14 Justice Harlan wrote, "But in view of the 
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no supe­
rior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes 
among citizens."15 Ultimately, Justice Harlan's imagery of the col­
orblind Constitution stands for the premise that civil liberties may 
not be protected, advanced, or inhibited on the basis of a citizen's 
race.16 This learned principle finally came to constitutional fruition 
in Brown v. Board of EducationP After nearly six decades, the 
hostility of the Jim Crow era finally faded into the dark annals of 
American constitutional history.18 Brown represented the proposi­
tion that black students' educational rights, and civil liberties in 
general, could no longer be disadvantaged because of their race, 
nor could white students' rights continue to be advanced because of 
their race.19 Chief Justice Warren wrote, "Today, education ... per­
haps [one of] the most important functions of state and local gov­
ernment ... is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms."20 
Nevertheless, some endings fail to represent new beginnings. 
The counter-culture resistance of the 1960s rejected many of the 
values of equality established during the previous decade.21 The 
loss of trust in government, intensified by Vietnam and Watergate, 
caused Americans to be wary of official motives.22 Moreover, 
groundbreaking events such as James Meredith's attempt to enter 
the University of Mississippi amid a flurry of racial hysteria forever 
13. 163 u.S. 537, 544, 551-52 (1896). 
14. Id. at 559. 
15. Id. 
16. See id. 




21. 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE American Constitution: Its Origins and De­
velopment 598, 612 (7th ed. 1991). 
22. Id. 
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changed both the moral and constitutional trajectory of American 
society.23 It was during this era that the focus on liberty and equal­
ity of rights, foundational principles of the Republic, and the Four­
teenth Amendment was replaced with the equality plus paradigm.24 
With equality plus, the Constitution's once paramount negative lib­
erties, enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amend­
ments, were to morph into affirmative entitlements and special 
privileges.25 Equality plus then administered these entitlements 
and privileges to the descendants of historically disadvantaged citi­
zens based on immutable characteristics such as race. 
The term affirmative action appeared officially for the first 
time in 1935 in the National Labor Relations Act.26 The term be­
gan to take on its more contemporary meaning in 1961, even before 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed.27 President Kennedy issued 
Executive Order 10925, which went far beyond prohibiting discrim­
ination.28 Executive Order 10925 required federal contractors to 
take affirmative action to ensure that applicants were employed and 
treated fairly during the term of their employment.29 An Executive 
Order promulgated by President Johnson in 1965 broadened the 
Kennedy Order by creating the Office of Federal Contract Compli­
ance, which monitored the participation levels of minorities and 
women and developed timetables for the prompt creation of equal 
employment opportunity.3D Finally, under the Nixon Administra­
tion, Revised Order 4 required contractors to add minorities and 
women to their affirmative action plans and develop goals for cor­
recting deficiencies.31 
23. LEE EpSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR A CHANG· 
ING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 391-92 (3d ed. 1998). 
24. 2 KELLY ET AL., supra note 21, at 609 (stating that official evenhandedness is 
not enough and government must take an affirmative role in leveling the playing field 
for minorities by providing racial preferences in state-created educational and employ­
ment opportunities). 
25. See Patricia A. Cain, The Right to Privacy under the Montana Constitution: 
Sex and Intimacy, 64 MONT. L. REV. 99, 127 (2003) (explaining that negative liberty is 
simply the right to be free from government intrusion and regUlation). 
26. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. §§ 151-169 (2000»; see 
Martha West, The Historical Roots ofAffirmative Action, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 607, 611-12 
(1998) (explaining that if an employer violates the NLRA by discriminating against an 
employee for concerted union activity, the NLRB remedies the violation by ordering 
the employer to take "affirmative action," including reinstatement and/or back pay). 
27. West, supra note 26, at 613-14. 
28. Exec. Order No. 10,925,26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961). 
29. Id. at §§ 301-302. 
30. West, supra note 26, at 613-14. 
31. Id. at 614. 
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The scope of affirmative action, or taking race or gender into 
account when making employment decisions, was broadened in the 
1970s in the field of student admissions.32 The Department of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare amended its regulations imple­
menting Title VI, which provides that there shall be no discrimina­
tion in federally funded educational institutions.33 The regulations 
instructed institutions to consider race to overcome low minority 
enrollment.34 The American Association of Law Schools recog­
nized in the 1960s that "there was a long tradition of separateness 
between the [top] schools" in the nation, which attempted to pre­
serve Anglo-Saxon Protestant domination of the legal profession, 
and the poorer schools, which accepted large numbers of socio-eco­
nomically disadvantaged students.35 Racial preferences were seen 
as a way to level the field of competition and create new educa­
tional opportunities for minorities.36 
II. NAVIGATING THE CHOPPY WATERS OF AFFIRMATIVE 





A. Bakke's Legacy: The Great Battle of the Circuits 
The Supreme Court's first consideration of racial preferences 
in the context of public university admissions came in a 4-1-4 split 
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.37 In 
Bakke, the Court considered whether the University of California 
at Davis Medical School's dual admissions policy complied with the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The ad­
missions policy set quotas to ensure a certain number of seats for 
minority applicants.39 Although all applicants were judged pursu­
ant to the same characteristics, minority applicants competed only 
against each other before a special minority admissions committee 
for a predetermined number of places in the incoming class.40 
32. Id. at 619. 
33. 37 Fed. Reg. 24,686-24,696 (Nov. 18, 1972). 
34. Id. 
35. Anthony 1. Scanlon, The History and Culture of Affirmative Action, 1988 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 345 (1988). 
36. Frank Rene Lopez, Pedagogy on Teaching Race and Law: Beyond "Talk 
Show" Discussions, 10 TEX. HISP. 1. L. & POL'y 39, 44 (2004). 
37. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
38. Id. at 269-70. 
39. Ed. at 275-76. 
40. Ed. at 274-75. 
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Justice Powell, providing the swing vote for the use of strict 
scrutiny, announced the Court's puzzling judgment. The plurality 
found the affirmative action program unconstitutional as a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.41 Surviving strict scrutiny review 
requires that the University's consideration of race serve a compel­
ling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that inter­
est.42 The plurality held that although racial diversity could be a 
compelling state interest because a diverse student body contributes 
to the robust exchange of ideas,43 the strict quota policy was not a 
narrowly tailored means to achieve the objective of diversity.44 
Justice Powell articulated that "race or ethnic background may 
be deemed 'a plus'" in weighing the many factors in favor of an 
applicant.45 Justice Powell pointed to a model program existing at 
Harvard University as the paradigm for the affirmation of his analy­
sis.46 While Justice Powell wrote that "'societal discrimination' 
does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon 
persons ... who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the bene­
ficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suf­
fered," he also envisioned a future in which the "robust exchange" 
of ideas of diverse groups will advance the cause of academia.47 A 
fair reading of Bakke still seems to affirm the supremacy of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a shield rather than a sword.48 Bakke 
represents the crossroads between the remedial and diversity mod­
41. Id. at 320. 
42. Id. at 299. 
43. Id. at 312. 
44. See id. at 319-20. 
45. Id. at 312. 
46. Id. at 316; see Suzanne E. Eckes, Race-Conscious Admissions Programs: 
Where do Universities Go From Gratz and Grutter?, 33 J. L. & EDUC. 21, 25 (2004) 
(explaining that the Harvard Plan is a holistic model that considers race as one "plus" 
factor among many different considerations that could include geography or personal 
experiences when evaluating potential candidates for students in educational institu­
tions). But see Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard 
College Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 
385-90 (1979) (noting that the Harvard Plan had its genesis as a Jewish quota designed 
to achieve a better reflection of the nation's population by limiting the number of Jew­
ish students attending Harvard). 
47. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-12 (quoting Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967». 
48. See generally Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution 
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1533-34 (1972) (explaining that the constitution 
may be used as a shield by providing protection from the arbitrary exercise of state 
power, while the constitution as sword concept envisions constitutional provisions that 
appear to prohibit state action to go one step further and permit affirmative remedies 
for constitutional violations). 
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els, in which the Court tries to establish its own footing with respect 
to the priority of remedial interests, societal discrimination and 
diversity.49 
Nonetheless, the only clear consequence of Bakke is confusion 
in the federal circuits since it was decided in 1978. In the several 
years following Bakke, a deep ideological rift developed between 
the Fifth Circuit in Texas and the Sixth Circuit in Michigan over the 
use of race in the admissions decisions of each state's law schools. 
In Hopwood v. State of Texas, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
Bakke was not binding because Justice Powell's decision did not 
represent a majority, and held that the University of Texas School 
of Law discriminated in favor of minority applicants by giving them 
a substantial racial preference in its admissions program.50 In prac­
tice, the University of Texas treated a special group of minorities, 
particularly African and Mexican Americans, differently than all 
other candidates.51 In fact, African and Mexican Americans were 
placed on entirely separate admission tracks where lower standards 
were acceptable for admission.52 The minimum Texas Index (TI) 
admission score for resident whites and non-preferred minorities 
was 199, while "Mexican Americans and blacks needed a TI of only 
189 to be presumptively admitted."53 As a result, the Texas admis­
sion program would admit "a minority candidate with a TI of 189 
... even though his score was considerably below the level at which 
a white candidate almost certainly would be rejected."54 Therefore, 
the separate admission criteria created a substantial racial prefer­
ence and a dual admission standard.55 Although no positions were 
set aside or reserved, the purpose of lower standards was, as the 
University of Texas described it, "to meet 'an aspiration' of admit­
ting a class consisting of 10% Mexican Americans and 5% Black."56 
The court noted, "The central purpose of the Equal Protection 
Clause 'is to prevent states from purposefully discriminating be­
tween individuals on the basis of race."'57 Applying strict scrutiny, 
49. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-12 (quoting Keyishan v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603 (1967». 
50. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944, 965 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). 
51. Id. at 936. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 937. 
55. See id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993». 
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the Hopwood court ruled that "any consideration of race or ethnic­
ity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student 
body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. "58 The court reasoned that such consideration "frustrates, 
rather than facilitates, the goals of equal protection" by perpetuat­
ing improper stereotypes.59 The court viewed "modern equal pro­
tection doctrine as recognizing only one compelling state interest 
... : remedying the effects of de jure racial discrimination. "60 In 
essence, a compelling state interest may not be used to remedy gen­
eral societal biases and private actions that have no nexus to state 
action.61 Hence, to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Hopwood court would 
have had to find that the law school was a de jure discriminator and 
that there were present effects of past discrimination.62 The Hop­
wood court found no such evidence.63 
In addressing the diversity rationale, the court stated that the 
rationale fosters rather than minimizes racial inequality by "treating 
minorities as a group, rather than as individuals."64 The Fifth Cir­
cuit panel reasoned that the diversity rationale promoted improper 
stereotypes through the belief that a person's race controls his point 
of view.65 The court deemed the diversity model irrational because 
it was synonymous with choosing applicants "based upon the physi­
cal size or blood type."66 In the end, the Fifth Circuit viewed the 
diversity rationale as a self-defeating mechanism that thwarts the 
goal of ending racially motivated state action.67 
A few years after the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood, the Su­
preme Court encountered another law school affirmative action 
plan, this one developed in Michigan.68 Grutter v. Bollinger would 
finally allow the Supreme Court to revisit the issues considered in 
Bakke and announce a rule that either supported or weakened the 
controversial 4-1-4 split. Grutter began when a white female from 
Michigan with a 3.8 GPA and a 161 LSAT score was denied admis­
58. Id. at 944. 
59. Id. at 945. 
60. Id. 
61. See id. 
62. Id. at 952. 
63. Id. at 955. 
64. Id. at 944-45. 
65. Id. at 946. 
66. Id. at 945. 
67. /d. at 947-48. 
68. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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sion to the Law Schoo1.69 The University of Michigan claimed to 
evaluate the totality of the applicant.7° The admissions policy mea­
sured "hard factors" such as GPA and LSAT scores as well as per­
sonal statements and letters of recommendation.71 The policy also 
evaluated "soft factors," including the quality of the undergraduate 
institution, the difficulty of the major, the enthusiasm of the recom­
mender and, most controversially, race.72 The University of Michi­
gan asserted its "longstanding commitment to 'one particular type 
of diversity,' racial and ethnic diversity, with special reference to 
the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically 
disadvantaged, specifically African Americans and Hispanics. "73 
The University's rationale for taking racial preferences into consid­
eration during the admissions process was "to 'achieve that diver­
sity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus 
make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts.' "74 
To achieve this objective, the University reserved a range or 
group of seats of an unspecified amount for racial minorities, which 
it called a "critical mass."75 It believed that a critical mass of mi­
nority students was essential to the law school because it added a 
unique character to the student body.76 The Director of Admis­
sions frequently consulted daily reports on the racial makeup of the 
incoming class and informed admissions workers how close they 
were to assembling the critical mass of minority students.77 Michi­
gan defined "critical mass" as a "meaningful number," that is, "a 
number that encourages underrepresented minority students to 
participate in the classroom and not feel isolated. "78 The Director 
of Admissions testified that if she could not consider the race of the 
applicant, a critical mass of minority students would not be 
achieved by considering LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA 
alone.79 The difference between a quota and a critical mass appears 
to be that a quota is an officially predetermined, announced num­
ber, such as 10%. In contrast, a critical mass is an unannounced 
69. Id. at 316. 
70. Id. at 314-15. 
71. Id. at 315. 
72. Id. at 315-16. 
73. Id. at 316. 
74. Id. at 315 (citation omitted). 
75. Id. at 316. 
76. Id. at 315-16. 
77. Id. at 318. 
78. Id. at 318-19. 
79. Id. at 318. 
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target percentage or range that varies between two reasonably close 
outer limits, such as between 9% and 12%. A quota and a previ­
ously undetermined critical mass appear to be functional 
equivalents.8o 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and held 
that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy was 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest in achieving a di­
verse student body.81 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, the 
Sixth Circuit in Grutter felt bound by stare decisis: it had to follow 
Justice Powell's decision in Bakke because his opinion provided the 
narrowest support for the Court's judgment.82 The Grutter opinion 
focused on the notion that when race is used as a plus, it enhances 
diversity because "a 'black student can often bring something [to 
the university] that a white person cannot offer.' "83 In addition, the 
Sixth Circuit opined that the Michigan plan was drafted to comply 
with Bakke because the critical mass application was not a quota in 
that the applicants were treated as individuals and all pertinent ele­
ments of diversity were taken into consideration.84 
B. 	 The O'Connor Factor: The High Court Endorses the Diversity 
Rationale in Education 
Grutter v. Bollinger finally made it to the Supreme Court.85 In 
the end, as many keen Court watchers had predicted, Justice 
O'Connor lived up to her recent reputation of siding with the so­
cially progressive members of the Court on highly charged individ­
ual rights issues.86 Justice O'Connor was the deciding vote on the 
question whether racial diversity is a compelling state interest.87 
She decided that it is a compelling state interest, and that, when 
achieved through the critical mass model, an affirmative action plan 
80. 	 See id. at 378-79 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
81. 	 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 742, 748 (6th Cir. 2002). 
82. Id. at 742. The court applied the rule providing that "'[w]hen a fragmented 
court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those 
members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.'" Id. at 739 (citing 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977». 
83. 	 Id. at 746 (citation omitted). 
84. 	 Id. at 744-47. 
85. 	 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
86. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (holding that Ne­
braska's Partial Birth Abortion statute was unconstitutional because it imposed an un­
due burden on a woman's right to have an abortion). 
87. 	 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
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survives constitutional review.88 
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, endorsed the Bakke 
plurality's view that student body diversity is a compelling state in­
terest that can justify the use of racial preferences in university ad­
missions.89 This decision was based on the Court's finding that 
diversity "helps to break down racial stereotypes" as well as to en­
lighten and liven classroom discussion.9° By accepting this view, the 
majority applied an unprecedented version of strict scrutiny, water­
ing the standard down to little more than rational basis review. Jus­
tice O'Connor set this tone by deciding that strict scrutiny must 
take context into consideration in a significant way.91 Thus, in 
Grutter, strict scrutiny included a good-faith reliance on the "educa­
tional judgment" of the school "that diversity is essential to its edu­
cational mission."92 Part of the law school's compelling interest was 
assuring that minority students have a place within the student 
body.93 This was especially important because minority students 
were "less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on [the ba­
sis of their LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA alone]."94 
Next, the Grutter majority analyzed the critical mass system 
under the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. The Court found 
that the University's system was narrowly tailored to achieve racial 
diversity in the higher education setting, the compelling state inter­
est first announced in Bakke.95 While the Court held that a fixed 
numerical quota is unconstitutional, it accepted the concept of a 
critical mass.96 Justice O'Connor ruled that an impermissible quota 
exists where a fixed number of seats are reserved exclusively for 
minority students, but explained that "'[s lome attention to num­
bers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions sys­
tem into a rigid quota."97 Consequently, the Court endorsed the 
state's right to reserve seats for minority students, to form a critical 
mass, so long as the institution does not announce beforehand ex­
actly how many seats or precisely what percentage of the class the 
critical mass will make up in a particular year. The University of 
88. Id. 
89. See id. at 327-28. 
90. Id. at 330. 
91. Id. at 327. 
92. See id. at 328. 
93. See id. at 338. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 334; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
96. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335-36. 
97. Id. at 336. 
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Michigan's critical mass concept appears to have survived strict 
scrutiny because the admissions committee stated that it evaluates 
all factors, including race, that contribute to student body diver­
sity.98 In practice, the institution can adhere to an unfixed range of 
minority applicants, for example, between X% and Y% of African 
Americans. In short, the means are permissible as long as the insti­
tution does not pre-announce a fixed number, and promises to look 
at all factors in the admissions equation to reach its goal of achiev­
ing a diverse student body. 
The Supreme Court proceeded with its unusual deference to 
the university under the strict scrutiny analysis by articulating that 
"[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceiva­
ble race-neutral alternative," including lowering standards for en­
trance, but merely requires a "serious, good faith consideration of 
workable race-neutral [methods] that will achieve the diversity the 
university seeks."99 The Court also upheld the Law School's pro­
gram despite its lack of a sunset provision. lOo It took "the Law 
School at its word that it ... will terminate [the] race-conscious[] 
program as soon as practicable. "101 The Court stated in dicta that it 
expected that in twenty-five years, the use of racial preferences 
would no longer be necessary to further the interest of racial 
diversity.l02 
III. THE REMEDIAL FRAMEWORK OF AFFIRMATIVE AcnON IN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT: FROM WYGANT103 
TO ADARANDl04 
A. Case Law Analysis 
The development of racial preferences in public employment 
began in 1986 with the members of the High Court sparring over 
the meaning of equality. lOS For the next several years, opinions rid­
dled with pluralities and, consequently, uncertainties, fostered con­
fusion regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to 
98. Id. at 336-37. 
99. Id. at 339. 
100. Id. at 343, 341-42 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). 
101. Id. at 343. 
102. See id. (implying that racial diversity will still be a compelling state interest). 
103. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
104. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
105. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267. 
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affirmative action in public employment.106 Led many times by the 
newly appointed Justice O'Connor, the Court tried to establish 
equilibrium within the American common law.107 The fundamental 
ideological debate centered on the nature of the discrimination it­
self, and against whom the discrimination was directed.10s While 
some Justices deemed benign discrimination a permissible method 
of fostering equality, other Justices felt that attempting to force 
equality through inequality was self-defeating.109 Ultimately, in 
1989, and again in 1995, the Court respectively adopted and reaf­
firmed the strict scrutiny test as the constitutionally correct level of 
review in so-called benign discrimination cases.110 However, the 
path from Wygant to Adarand with its many concurrences and dis­
sents leaves two fundamental issues still somewhat uncertain: (1) 
how rigorously will strict scrutiny actually be applied; and (2) are 
there any non-remedial purposes, such as racial diversity as recog­
nized in the educational context in Grutter, that can serve as a com­
pelling state interest in the context of public employment? 
1. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, Justice Powell led 
the plurality in announcing a framework that addressed what can, 
and more notably what cannot constitute a compelling state interest 
under strict scrutiny in the public employment context.111 Wygant 
considered the issue of "whether a school board . . . may extend 
preferential protection against layoffs to [minority teachers]" in ac­
cordance with the Equal Protection Clause.11z A provision in the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Jackson School 
Board and its teachers "protect[ ed] employees who were members 
of certain minority groups" from being laid off.113 The provision 
created a statistical model that commanded the board not to layoff 
a greater percentage of minority teachers than were currently work­
106. Compare Wygant, 476 U.S. at 267, and Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 
547, 566 (1990), with Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 200. 
107. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 204; City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989). 
108. 1.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see id. at 527 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
109. See id. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
110. Id. at 493-94 (majority opinion); Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. at 227. 
111. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-76. 
112. Id. at 269-70. 
113. Id. at 270. 
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ing for the board at the time.1l4 Thereafter, the non-minority 
teachers brought an Equal Protection action in federal district 
court, where the program was upheld.1l5 Applying rational basis, 
the court reasoned that no finding of prior discrimination was re­
quired and that the goal of providing role models for young minor­
ity students was sufficient to uphold the layoff provision.1l6 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's af­
firmation of the district court's ruling.117 The plurality began by 
noting "that the level of scrutiny does not change merely because 
the challenged classification operates against a group that histori­
cally has not been subject to governmental discrimination."1l8 
Even though the discriminatory classification operates against 
whites, it is nevertheless a classification based on race.1l9 The plu­
rality announced strict scrutiny as the constitutionally correct analy­
sis and found that the Board's plan fell short of this stringent test.120 
The plurality noted that it had never held that general notions of 
societal discrimination are, in themselves, sufficient to meet the 
compelling government interest requirement.121 "Rather, ... some 
showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit involved" 
is the benchmark for having a proper remedial purpose.122 "Socie­
tal discrimination, without more is too amorphous . . . . "123 To 
make the proper evidentiary showing, the fact finder must believe 
"that the employer had a strong basis in the evidence for its conclu­
sion that remedial action was necessary."124 A proponent must 
demonstrate the existence of identified state discrimination re­
flected by a significant statistical disparity between the racial com­
position of the school teaching staff and qualified minorities in the 
local labor pool, as well as anecdotal evidence.125 The Court 
stressed that in the absence of these findings, a court could uphold 
remedies that are "ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless 
in their ability to affect the future. "126 In that spirit, the Court re­
114. Id. 
115. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 (D. Mich. 1982). 
116. Id. at 1202·03. 
117. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284. 
118. Id. at 273. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 283-84. 
121. Id. at 274. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 276. 
124. Id. at 277 (emphasis added). 
125. Id. at 274-76. 
126. Id. at 276. 
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jected the Board's role model theory because it lacked a valid reme­
dial purpose.127 The idea that black students are better off with 
black teachers was offensive to the Court because it represented a 
pre-Brown mentality.128 
In discussing the narrow tailoring prong, the plurality focused 
primarily on the rights of non-minorities by considering the heavy 
burden imposed on them by the preferential layoff provision.129 
Although some impact on the rights of the majority is tolerable, the 
means chosen by the Jackson County School Board placed it out of 
the realm of constitutionality because of the encumbrance of losing 
of an existing job, and hence, losing seniority,13O The plan was not 
narrowly tailored because race-neutral alternatives were not ade­
quately considered, and the range of minorities included a non-spe­
cific and overly broad collection of the nation's diverse races.l3l 
Perhaps more intriguing than the plurality opinion is Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence. This opinion, in many ways, foreshad­
owed her majority opinion in Grutter,132 Although O'Connor an­
nounced that the Court was applying strict scrutiny, she began her 
analysis by stating that the distinction between a compelling and an 
important governmental purpose may be negligible.133 In addition, 
O'Connor noted that the "remedial purpose need not be accompa­
ni~d by contemporaneous findings," and that even a non-remedial 
purpose might qualify as a compelling government interest.134 Jus­
tice O'Connor opined that "although its precise contours are uncer­
tain, a state interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been 
found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher edu­
cation, to support the use of racial considerations to further that 
interest."135 Therefore, at least in Wygant, O'Connor left open the 
possibility that the racial diversity rationale announced in Grutter 
might emerge in the public employment context.136 While Wygant 
centered upon the compelling government interest component of 
strict scrutiny in the employment context, the precise form of the 
narrow tailoring prong still required outlining. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
129. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-83. 
130. Id. at 283-84. 
131. Id. at 284 n.13. 
132. Id. at 284-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
133. Id. at 286. 
134. Id. 
135. [d. 
136. Id. at 287. 
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2. United States v. Paradise 
In United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court specified a 
number of balancing considerations to guide lower courts in deter­
mining whether an affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored.137 
The question in Paradise was whether a district court-ordered re­
quirement of a 50% promotion for black Alabama state troopers 
was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.138 The suit began in 1972 with a federal district court 
finding that the Alabama police department had systematically ex­
cluded blacks from employment.139 The district court determined 
that in its thirty-seven year history, the patrol never had a black 
trooper.140 The district judge formed a plan to combat Alabama's 
discrimination of African Americans.141 The district court ordered 
injunctive relief and instructed the Department to "hire one black 
trooper for each white trooper hired until [qualified] blacks consti­
tuted approximately 25% of the state trooper force."142 After more 
than a decade of court supervision, the department never made 
meaningful progress, and in 1983, a final court order provided that 
for a limited period, "at least 50% of the promotions to corporal 
must be awarded to black troopers, if qualified black candidates 
were available."143 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court's order.144 It concluded that the relief at issue was a tempo­
rary remedy intended to correct the egregious effects of past racial 
discrimination.145 
The trouble in Paradise began with the Supreme Court, once 
again, conjuring up a paltry plurality, led by Justice Brennan.146 
The Court therefore failed to reach a consensus on the appropriate 
level of judicial scrutiny. The plurality held that the affirmative ac­
tion plan survived strict scrutiny, so it was not necessary to reach a 
majority consensus on the level of scrutiny.147 The plurality further 
held that the Alabama plan was narrowly tailored to achieve a com­
137. 480 u.s. 149, 171 (1987). 
138. Id. at 153. 
139. Id. at 154. 
140. Id. at 159. 
141. Id. at 154-55. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 162, 163. 
144. Id. at 165. 
145. Id. at 165-66. 
146. See id. at 153. 
147. Id. at 166-67. 
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pelling government interest.14s Paradise confirmed Wygant's cen­
tral principle that the government "has a compelling interest in 
remedying past and present discrimination by the state actor."149 
Four decades of state exclusion of blacks from upper rank positions 
unquestionably created a compelling state interest in remedying a 
hiring process that was riddled with discrimination.150 
The Court announced a set of balancing considerations that are 
still used by lower courts to ascertain whether an affirmative action 
plan meets the narrow tailoring requirement.15I Courts must look 
to the following factors: (1) "the necessity for the relief"; (2) "the 
efficacy of [race-neutral] alternative remedies"; (3) "the flexibility 
and duration of the relief, including the availability of waiver provi­
sions"; (4) "the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant 
labor market [statistics]"; and (5) "the impact of the relief on" third 
party rightS.152 
In applying the announced factors, the Paradise plurality found 
that the 50% promotion quota was narrowly tailored.153 First, the 
plurality ascertained that the relief chosen was necessary to achieve 
the objective sought due to Alabama's tumultuous racial past and 
manifest disregard of the district court's order to correct past effects 
of discrimination.154 Second, even race-neutral alternatives pro­
posed by Alabama failed to correct expeditiously the effects of past 
discrimination.155 Third, the practical operation of the 50% promo­
tion requirement was adequately "flexible, waivable, and tempo­
rary."156 Such flexibility included a waiver of the racial preference 
plan if no qualified black candidates were available.157 Fourth, the 
court-ordered plan would only last until the department came up 
with a promotion procedure that discontinued official discrimina­
tion against African Americans.15S Flexibility was also demon­
strated because the 50% requirement was simply a means to 
achieve the goal of 25% representation.159 Finally, the Court held 
148. Id. at 167. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 170. 
151. Id. at 171. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 185-86. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 172. 
156. Id. at 178. 
157. Id. at 177. 
158. Id. at 178. 
159. Id. at 163-64. 
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that the affirmative action plan "did not impose an unacceptable 
burden on innocent third parties. "160 After all, the plan did not "re­
quire the layoff and discharge of white employees. "161 Ultimately, 
the announcement of the balancing test created a situation in which 
no stringent rules would control the constitutionality of racial pref­
erences in employment. Rather, the jurisprudence would develop 
on a case-by-case basis. Any or all of these factors could be applied 
fully, or in part, depending on the specific case on review. A mean­
ingful amount of discretion was left with the judicial branch. How­
ever, with discretion comes uncertainty. 
As in Wygant, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Para­
dise demonstrated how a swing vote could affect the expansion of 
Grutter into public employment. Justice O'Connor began by criti­
cizing the majority's application of the strict scrutiny test, writing 
that although "[t]he plurality today purports to apply strict scrutiny, 
... the Court adopts a standardless view of 'narrowly tailored' far 
less stringent than that required by strict scrutiny."162 Although 
Justice O'Connor did not view the affirmative action plan as a rigid 
quota, she acknowledged that more flexible goals might also "tram­
mel unnecessarily" the rights of non-minorities and must be done 
sparingly.163 One of Justice O'Connor's central concerns was that 
the plan was not "truly designed to eradicate the past effects" of 
discrimination.164 More dramatically, the one-for-one promotion 
quota "far exceeded the percentage of blacks in the trooper 
force." 165 Hence, the statistical comparison between the percent­
age of minority workers to be promoted and the percentage of mi­
nority group members in the relevant work force was improperly 
skewed.166 Justice O'Connor felt that the promotion goal must 
have a "closer relationship to the percentage of [minority group 
members] eligible for promotions" in the local labor pool.167 
Justice O'Connor next criticized the lack of good-faith consid­
eration of race-neutral alternatives such as "appoint[ing] a trustee 
to develop a promotion procedure that would satisfy the terms of 
the consent decrees."168 In O'Connor's view, at the very least, strict 
160. Id. at 182. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 196-97. 
163. Id. at 197. 
164. Id. at 198. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 199. 
168. Id. at 200. 
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scrutiny required "that the District Court expressly evaluate the 
available alternative remedies."169 
Ultimately, Justice O'Connor wrote that the affirmative action 
plan failed the narrow tailoring prong because it imposed a racial 
quota and did not adequately consider the efficacy of race-neutral 
alternatives.170 This dissenting opinion is particularly surprising 
when compared with O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter, in 
which she stood on the opposite side of the fence. l71 In Grutter, 
Justice O'Connor applied the same form of watered down strict 
scrutiny she condemned in Paradise. l72 A few years after Paradise, 
in City ofRichmond v. 1.A. Croson Co., the Supreme Court decided 
in a 6-3 opinion that strict scrutiny analysis is the appropriate test 
for courts to apply when examining state affirmative action pro­
grams.173 This consensus was, however, short-lived. 
3. City of Richmond v. 1.A. Croson Co. 
In Croson, the Justices split along ideological lines in a barrage 
of divergent opinions.174 Croson subtly returned to the pre-1989 
debate over whether non-remedial interests can be compelling and 
whether benign discrimination is constitutional.175 This case went 
beyond technicalities and provided insight into the Court's division 
over the constitutional value of racial preferences, an issue that re­
mains contentious.176 
The Croson saga began in 1983 when the Richmond City 
Council adopted the Minority Business Utilization Plan.177 This 
plan, declared "remedial in nature," required prime contractors re­
ceiving city contracts "to subcontract at least [30%] of the dollar 
169. [d. at 201. 
170. Id. 
171. Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,201 (1987) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that although the plurality purports to apply "strict scrutiny," the 
Court, in actuality, adopted a standardless review of the narrowly tailored component 
of strict scrutiny, much less stringent than required by traditional form of review), with 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003), in which Justice O'Connor led the major­
ity and accepted a much more relaxed application of strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring 
prong by not requiring a sunset provision and minimizing the duty of the law school to 
try race neutral admission alternatives. 
172. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
173. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989). 
174 . . Id. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 
528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
175. [d. at 476-77 (majority opinion). 
176. [d. at 511 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 
528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
177. Id. at 477 (majority opinion). 
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amount of these contracts to Minority Business Enter­
prises"("MBEs")P8 An MBE is a business in which "at least 
[51 %] ... is owned and controlled ... by minority group mem­
bers."179 Minorities who qualified under the plan included "citizens 
... who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos 
or Aleuts. "180 A waiver would be granted only under exceptional 
circumstances.181 Proponents of the plan relied on statistics show­
ing that while Richmond's general population was 50% black, only 
0.67% of the city's construction contracts were awarded to minority 
businesses from 1978 to 1983.182 The controversy arose when Rich­
mond compelled Croson, a general contractor, to offer a subcon­
tract to a minority firm, which ended up raising the cost of the 
project,183 The city denied Croson's request for a waiver, or in the 
alternative, an overall increase in the contract price. l84 Croson then 
filed suit against the City under § 1983.185 He contended that the 
Richmond ordinance was unconstitutional both facially and as ap­
plied to his case.186 
The central issue addressed was whether Richmond's 30% re­
quirement for minority subcontractors violated the Equal Protec­
tion Clause.187 The Court, led by Justice O'Connor, began by 
announcing strict scrutiny as the touchstone for constitutional re­
view.188 The Court held that the city's plan failed the strict scrutiny 
test because it was unable to show a compelling governmental inter­
est.189 Justice O'Connor concluded that none of the city's findings 
provided Richmond with a strong basis for its conclusion that reme­
dial action was necessary; the 30% financial quota could not be re­
alistically tied to an injury suffered by an individual citizen of 
Richmond.190 The generalized finding of societal discrimination 
reached by comparing the number of blacks in the local community 
to the number of black subcontractors awarded city contracts was 
178. Id. at 477-88. 
179. Id. at 478. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 479-80. 
183. Id. at 482-83. 
184. Id. at 483. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 477-78. 
188. Id. at 493. 
189. Id. at 498-99. 
190. Id. at 499. 
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wholly improper.191 The proper statistical comparison is the ratio 
of qualified black subcontractors in the local labor market to the 
number of minority owned business that are awarded city 
contracts.192 
In conducting the narrow tailoring analysis, Justice O'Connor 
indicated that the program was flawed because the 30% quota was 
a rigid target that was completely unrelated to a proper remedial 
purpose and could only have served the unconstitutional goal of 
"outright racial balancing."193 In addition, the plan was over-inclu­
sive because it included obscure minority groups whose histories 
were relatively unscathed by this Republic's racist past.194 Finally, 
Richmond failed to discuss adequately, or even consider, viable 
race-neutral alternatives to its race-based quota.195 Such alterna­
tives should have included "[s]implification of bidding procedures, 
relaxation of bonding requirements, and training and financial aid 
for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races."l96 Justice O'Connor 
stressed the importance of the temporary nature of racial prefer­
ences to ensure that deviation from equal treatment has meaningful 
limits.197 
Croson also provided insight into some of the Justices' core 
ideologies. For example, Justice O'Connor felt that the Richmond 
plan was unconstitutional because the determination was based 
solely on race.198 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect, as Grutter 
illustrates, that O'Connor would uphold a plan where race is ac­
companied by other factors. Justice O'Connor also highlighted the 
importance of strict scrutiny as a means of discerning benign or re­
medial classifications from those motivated by racial politics.199 
Hence, in Justice O'Connor's view, it appears there is a difference 
between discrimination aimed at the minority and discrimination 
aimed at the majority to correct the discrimination directed at the 
minority. Yet, in contrast to her concurrence in Wygant,2oo Justice 
191. Id. at 501-02. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 507. 
194. Id. at 506. 
195. Id. at 507. 
196. Id. at 509-10. 
197. Id. at 510. 
198. See id. at 493. 
199. Id. 
200. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284-86 (1986) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (implying that even a non-remedial purpose such as racial diversity might 
qualify as a compelling government interest). 
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O'Connor articulated that "[ u ]nless [racial classifications] are 
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may [exacerbate] no­
tions of racial inferiority and lead to ... racial hostility."201 There­
fore, Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Croson seems to reject her 
earlier argument that other non-remedial interests, such as racial 
diversity, should qualify as compelling governmental interests 
under the first prong of the strict scrutiny analysis.202 
Justice Stevens took a view similar to that of Justice O'Connor 
in Wygant. 203 Although voting with the majority, Justice Stevens 
wrote a separate concurrence to voice his opinion that the remedial 
goal of correcting past or present discrimination should not be the 
only governmental interest considered compelling.204 In particular, 
Justice Stevens implied that the government interest of racial diver­
sity could very well withstand strict scrutiny.205 
Justice Scalia's opinion provides an important description of 
the color-neutral paradigm of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Jus­
tice Scalia's view, discrimination, whether branded benign or invidi­
ous, is contrary to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.206 The 
official exercise of discriminatory racial classifications, whether di­
rected at those whose skin is black or those whose skin is white, is 
equally offensive to the Constitution.207 Justice Scalia believes that 
rights and benefits cannot be protected, advanced, or diminished on 
the basis of race.208 Attempting to even the score is self-defeating 
in that it "reinforce[s] a manner of thinking ... that was the source 
of the [racial] injustice" itself.209 
Justice Marshall's opinion represents the progressive jurispru­
dential view of the contemporary critical race theorists.210 Accord­
ing to Justice Marshall, strict scrutiny is inappropriate in some racial 
classification contexts.211 Justice Marshall would require that racial 
201. Id. 
202. See id. 
203. Id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the jUdgment). 
204. Id. at 511. 
205. Id. at 511-12 
206. Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
207. [d. at 527-28. 
208. [d. 
209. Id. at 527. 
210. See Rachel F. Moran, People of Color, Women, and the Public Corporation: 
Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 899, 906-12 (2005) (explaining 
that Critical Race Theory challenges traditional biological understandings of race and 
considers race a social construct that remains tainted by the legacy and institution of 
both intentional and subtle racism). 
211. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
222 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:199 
preference plans be subject to intermediate scrutiny.212 Under this 
more lenient standard, the affirmative action plan "must serve 
[only] important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to [the] achievement of those objectives."213 On a broad 
scale, Justice Marshall considered racial discrimination designed to 
help minorities "by remedying the effects of discrimination" to be 
benign and deserving of constitutional protection.214 Therefore, 
rights could more easily be protected on the basis of race if the 
racial classification operated against the political majority and in 
favor of the political minority.215 
4. 	 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Commission 
Justice Marshall's minority position became a constitutional re­
ality just one year later in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Com
munications Commission.216 One significant difference between 
Croson and Metro Broadcasting, however, is that Metro Broadcast
ing involved the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amend­
ment's Due Process Clause rather than that of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.217 Leading the majority in Metro Broadcasting, Jus­
tice Brennan announced a new concept of equality. 
Metro Broadcasting dealt with the "minority preference poli­
cies of the Federal Communications Commission."218 The principal 
question was whether awarding a preference to minorities in the 
bidding process for the Federal Communication Commission 
("FCC") licenses contravened the Equal Protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment.219 The FCC defined minorities as "Black, 
Hispanic Surnamed, American Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian, 
and Asiatic American. "220 The origin of these racial preferences 
began as an amendment to the Federal Communications Act of 
1934.221 In response to the scarcity of minority groups holding 
212. See id. 
213. Id. (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 428 U.S. 265, 359 (1978». 
214. See id. at 552-53. 
215. See id. 
216. Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,566 (1990) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
217. Id. at 552. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 554 n.1 (citing Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad­
casting Facilities, 68 F.CC 2d 979, 980 n.8 (1978)). 
221. See 47 U.S.C §§ 151, 301, 303, 307, 309 (1982). The amendment sought to 
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broadcast licenses, the FCC authorized minority preferences as a 
means of increasing broadcast viewpoints.222 The FCC reasoned 
that diversity of opinion in broadcasting better educates the non­
minority audience.223 Race was considered a plus factor among 
other factors including "full-time participation in station operation 
by owners, ... proposed program service, ... [and] efficient use of 
frequency."224 Metro Broadcasting challenged the constitutionality 
of this minority preference program when it lost a license to a mi­
nority-controlled firm.225 The FCC Review Board overturned the 
administrative law judge's decision, finding that despite Metro 
Broadcasting's "local residence and civic participation advantage," 
the 90% Hispanic makeup of Rainbow Broadcasting, Metro Broad­
casting's competitor for the license, warranted a substantial racial 
preference in Rainbow Broadcasting's favor.226 A divided Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's ruling.227 
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, applying a new level 
of scrutiny to affirm the Appeals Court decision.228 First, the Court 
noted the significance of this case, which dealt with a benign minor­
ity preference program specifically mandated by Congress.229 Due 
to explicit congressional direction, as opposed to state action, a 
greater level of deference was required.230 According to Justice 
Brennan, the decision in Croson announced just one year earlier 
was not applicable because it dealt with state action.231 Instead, the 
majority adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny to evaluate non­
remedial racial classifications authorized by the federal govern­
ment.232 The FCC's racial preference plan would be upheld under 
this model, so long as the initiative served an "important govern­
mental objective[] and ... [was] substantially related to the 
achievement of that objective.233 The Court held that the FCC plan 
follow in the footsteps of the original purpose of the statute, which was to actively 
enhance the cultural diversity of programming. Id. 
222. Metro Broad. Inc., 497 U.S. at 555-56. 
223. Id. at 556 (citing 68 F.C.C. 2d at 980-81). 
224. Id. at 556-57. 
225. Id. at 558-59. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 560. 
228. Id. at 566. 
229. Id. at 563. 
230. Id. at 564-65. 
231. Id. at 565. 
232. Id. at 564-65. 
233. Id. 
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met the criteria and was constitutional.234 In applying the first 
prong of intermediate scrutiny, the majority reasoned that broad­
cast diversity qualified as an important government objective be­
cause it "contribut[ed] to a 'robust exchange of ideas."'235 In turn, 
a higher representation of minority broadcasters would benefit the 
public at large by providing "access to a wider diversity of informa­
tion services. "236 
In conducting the substantial relationship analysis, the Court 
accorded deference to the expertise of the FCC, as well as to con­
gressional findings revealing that achieving the "nexus between mi­
nority ownership and [broadcast] diversity" could only be achieved 
through racial preferences.237 The race-neutral alternatives exe­
cuted by the commission in the decades before the affirmative ac­
tion plan was implemented were found to be ineffective.238 The 
majority also articulated that the plan was temporary because it 
would be subject to a series of congressional appropriations.239 Fi­
nally, the FCC's plan did not place an undue burden on third par­
ties. In order to correct injustice, "innocent persons may be called 
upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy."240 
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting further illus­
trates her inconsistent Equal Protection jurisprudence.241 While 
echoing points from her Wygant dissent, the opinion provided an 
ideology that stands at odds with her majority opinion in Grutter. 
Justice O'Connor stated that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
level of review because the harm caused by the racial classification 
was no less onerous if the action were taken by the federal govern­
ment rather than the state.242 A lower standard of review was sim­
ply too dangerous in that "the Government [could] resort to racial 
distinctions more readily."243 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the 
FCC's plan was unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it im­
permissibly provided benefits to some and burdens to others "based 
on the assumption that race . . . determines [socio-economic and 
234. Id. at 566. 
235. Id. at 568 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 
(1978». 
236. [d. 
237. [d. at 569. 
238. Id. at 585. 
239. Id. at 594. 
240. [d. at 596. 
241. Id. at 602-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
242. Id. at 604. 
243. Id. at 610. 
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political perspective]."244 Justice O'Connor also stated that 
"[m]odern Equal Protection [jurisprudence] has recognized only 
one [compelling] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimi­
nation. "245 Broadcast diversity is "too amorphous ... and ... unre­
lated to any legitimate basis for employing racial classifications" to 
be characterized as a compelling state interest.246 In fact, Justice 
O'Connor wrote that racial classifications must be left only for re­
medial settings, otherwise they would foster "notions of racial infer­
iority and ... hostility."247 The FCC scheme was, therefore, 
nothing more than an attempt at racial balancing, even though race 
was only one of many factors.248 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor 
stated that attempting to create "viewpoint diversity by identifying 
... a 'black viewpoint' [or] an 'Asian viewpoint'" would not even 
pass a low-level rational basis test.249 
5. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 
The final pillar of the remedial foundation of racial preferences 
in public employment was placed in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena.250 The Supreme Court authorized the use of strict scrutiny 
for any racial preference program, whether the classification is com­
mitted by the state or federal government and regardless of the race 
of the program's beneficiaries.251 Finally, a fundamental consensus 
was reached concluding that racial preference plans must be viewed 
with the utmost caution. Nevertheless, the freshly appointed Jus­
tices Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg, together with the wavering Jus­
tice O'Connor, left the practical application of strict scrutiny 
resembling a sheep dressed in wolf's clothing. 
The primary issue in Adarand was whether financial incentives 
provided to general contractors to hire minority sub-contractors 
contravened the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amend­
ment.252 The controversy began when Mountain Gravel & Con­
struction Company, a general contractor, awarded a guardrail 
subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company instead of 
244. Id. at 602. 
245. Id. at 612. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 613. 
248. Id. at 614 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 
(1989)). 
249. See id. at 612-15. 
250. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
251. Id. at 226. 
252. /d. at 204. 
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Adarand Constructors, notwithstanding Adarand's lower bid.253 
The prime contract was governed by the Surface Transportation 
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 ("STURAA").254 
The contract provided that if Mountain Gravel "hired subcontrac­
tors certified as small businesses controlled by 'socially and eco­
nomically disadvantaged individuals,''' it would receive 10% of the 
final amount of the approved minority subcontract as additional 
compensation.255 In addition, STURAA required that 10% of the 
appropriated funds be expended with small businesses "owned and 
controlled" by minority groups.256 When it lost the guardrail sub­
contract to the minority subcontractor, Adarand filed suit in federal 
court, "claiming that race-based presumptions involved in the use 
of [preferential] subcontracting compensation . . . violate [ d] [its] 
right to equal protection. "257 The Supreme Court vacated the 
Tenth Circuit's decision, which had affirmed the district court's 
granting of summary judgment to the government.258 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, began the Court's 
analysis by significantly reducing any precedential dissimilarities 
between Equal Protection obligations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and those under the Fifth Amendment.259 Both con­
stitutional provisions are analyzed in "precisely the same" way be­
cause both aim to provide uniformity and fair order and to prohibit 
arbitrary governmental power.260 
The Court overruled the use of intermediate scrutiny for be­
nign racial preference plans under the Fifth Amendment, which had 
been upheld in Metro Broadcasting.261 Therefore, "all racial classi­
fications, imposed by [any] governmental actor, must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."262 Hence, "such classifi­
cations are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored mea­
253. Id. at 205. 
254. Id. at 208; see Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat, 132 (1987). 
255. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 205, 209. Under The Small Business 
Act, such individuals are defined as those who have been subject to racial or ethnic 
prejudice because of their identity within such a group without regard to their individ­
ual qualities. Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Native Americans are presumed to be such 
individuals.Id. at 205 (citing 15 U.S.c. § 637(d)(2), (3) (1994». 
256. Id. at 208 (quoting the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation As­
sistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, 101 Stat. 145). 
257. Id. at 210. 
258. Id. at 210-12, 239. 
259. Id. at 213-18. 
260. See id. at 213-17. 
261. Id. at 226-27. 
262. Id. at 227. 
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sures that further compelling governmental interests."263 The 
majority dispelled the notion that benign discrimination is pre­
sumed to be more constitutionally tolerable than any other form of 
intentional racial discrimination.264 All racial classifications were 
now to be confronted with skepticism and treated consistently.265 
According to Justice O'Connor, Metro Broadcasting was an anom­
aly in the organic tradition of Equal Protection jurisprudence 
"stretching back over fifty years," which frowned upon protecting 
rights on the basis of innate characteristics.266 Nevertheless, Justice 
O'Connor "wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny [will 
always be] 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'267 Justice O'Connor 
believed that the government will be qualified, in particular in­
stances, to respond to "the lingering effects of racial discrimination 
against minority groups. "268 The Court remanded the case to the 
Tenth Circuit to apply the newly announced standards.269 
This decision remains significant because although it an­
nounced that the appropriate level of review is strict scrutiny, the 
application has been far from uniform, as demonstrated in Grutter. 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Metro Broadcasting leaves 
open the possibility that strict scrutiny is malleable. Consequently, 
Grutter's alternative application of strict scrutiny, which looked 
more like rational basis, could in theory allow the diversity ratio­
nale to seep into some areas of public employment. 
B. Summation 
Equal Protection jurisprudence in public employment now re­
quires the application of strict scrutiny review. The Supreme 
Court's progress from Wygant to Adarand solidified a number of 
vital principles. Ultimately, "all racial classifications imposed by 
[any] governmental actor," whether deemed invidious or benign, 
receive the most exacting form of constitutional review, embodied 
in strict scrutiny.27° 
To satisfy strict scrutiny, the governmental action must be justi­
263. Id. 
264. [d. at 226-27. 
265. Id. 
266. See id. at 231-32. 




270. /d. at 227. 
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fied by a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to 
achieve such interest.271 Currently, the Supreme Court has only 
found remedying the effects of past or present de jure discrimina­
tion to qualify as a compelling state interest.272 To satisfy the stan­
dard of proof required for state sponsored remediation, there must 
be a specific showing of prior or current intentional discrimina­
tion.273 This showing can be made by pointing to significant statisti­
cal disparities between the number of qualified minorities in the 
local labor pool and the number of minorities actually hired or pro­
moted.274 Additionally, the showing may include anecdotal evi­
dence.275 There must be a strong basis in the evidence to reach the 
conclusion that remedial action is necessary.276 If a court finds a 
compelling government interest, it then engages in a balancing test 
to ascertain whether the proposed plan is narrowly tailored.277 The 
factors for consideration include: 
the necessity for relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; 
the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability 
of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to 
the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the 
rights of third parties.278 
After Grutter was decided in June of 2003, the application of 
the strict scrutiny remedial framework announced in the Croson! 
Adarand line of cases grew uncertain. Would the remedial justifica­
tion be accompanied or perhaps even replaced with the freshly 
minted diversity rationale? 




A. Initial Reaction by the Supreme Court 
Grutter v. Bollinger redefined Equal Protection jurisprudence. 
For the first time, a clear majority of the Supreme Court applied 
strict scrutiny and legitimized a new rationale that fractured the 
271. Id. at 229. 
272. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
273. Id. at 277. 
274. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989). 
275. Concrete Works of Colorado v. City and County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 
958 (2003). 
276. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. 
277. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987). 
278. Id. at 206. 
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traditional remedial paradigm in the educational context.279 The 
concept of racial diversity, at least in the educational context, now 
qualifies as a compelling state interest under the first prong of strict 
scrutiny analysis.280 Justice O'Connor's rationale in Grutter was 
based on deference given to the University of Michigan's conclu­
sion that diversity enriches learning outcomes and better prepares 
students for the professional challenges ahead in an increasingly di­
verse workforce.281 In addition, the Grutter majority altered the 
narrow tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny analysis by imposing a 
less stringent application of the Paradise balancing factors.282 The 
Court accepted the concept of a critical mass as a permissible alter­
native to quotas.283 
The Court rejected the viable race-neutral alternative to lower­
ing admissions standards, across the board, to allow a broader array 
of students to gain acceptance.284 Notably, the Court did not ap­
pear overly concerned with the impact on non-minority students, 
who are adversely affected by the racial preference plan. The 
Court reasoned that because all pertinent elements of diversity are 
taken into account, all applicants can illustrate their uniqueness to 
the admissions committee.285 Although the Court expected that the 
program would not be necessary within 25 years, it upheld the plan 
despite its lack of a waiver or sunset provision.286 Therefore, the 
affirmative action plan may continue indefinitely.287 
Grutter was an important case and its impact is not limited to 
diversity in education. Grutter's expansion into the realm of public 
employment is contingent on three central inquiries. First, whether 
the Supreme Court will apply the watered down form of contextual 
strict scrutiny announced in Grutter to public employers, thereby 
279. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,328 (2003). 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 330. 
282. See id. at 334-35 (stating that the admission must be flexible when consider­
ing diversity). 
283. Id. at 335-36. A "critical mass" is an unannounced close range of seats gen­
erally intended for minorities, as opposed to an unconstitutional quota, which is an 
announced fixed range of spots reserved explicitly for minorities. Id. According to Jus­
tice O'Connor, "'some attention to numbers' ... does not transform a flexible admis­
sions system into a rigid quota" that contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 336 
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978)) (alteration in 
original). 
284. See id. at 337-38. 
285. Id. at 341. 
286. Id. at 342. 
287. Id. at 343. 
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giving public employers the unprecedented deference it gave the 
University of Michigan. Second, whether the Court will break with 
the traditional remedial paradigm and declare that racial diversity is 
a compelling state interest in public employment. Finally, whether 
the Court will apply the liberalized narrow tailoring analysis, which 
less rigidly and more arbitrarily applies the Paradise balancing 
factors. 
An initial response to the first inquiry was provided by the Su­
preme Court in 2003 when the Court denied certiorari from a Tenth 
Circuit case.288 Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. v. City and 
County ofDenver addressed whether the City of Denver had shown 
a strong basis in the evidence for remedying past discrimination in 
the construction industry.289 In dissenting from the Court's denial 
of certiorari, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ar­
gued that the Tenth Circuit improperly decided the case because it 
failed to apply the traditional strict scrutiny analysis of the Croson! 
Adarand line of cases.290 In particular, "[c]oming on the heels of 
... Grutter v. Bollinger," Scalia felt that the Court's decision to 
deny certiorari "invite [ d] speculation that [Croson] has effectively 
been overruled."291 
In finding that the City of Denver had a compelling interest in 
remedying past discrimination in the local construction industry, 
the Tenth Circuit upheld the city's annual goal that 10% of the total 
dollars spent on construction contracts be spent with minority­
owned businesses.292 The evidence that the City of Denver 
presented in support of its affirmative action ordinance included 
records, which did not indicate discrimination per se, but rather 
demonstrated findings of the city's noncompliance with affirmative 
action requirements, its failure to facilitate minority participation, 
288. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 540 U.S. 
1027 (2003) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
289. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 
(10th Cir. 2003). 
290. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1027, 1029-30. 
291. Id. at 1027. 
292. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 321 F.3d at 992, 994. A minority business was 
defined in the 1990 ordinance as at least 51 % owned by 1 or more members of the 
following minority groups: Blacks, Hispanics, Asian Americans or American Indians. 
[d. at 956. In addition, in order to qualify under the affirmative action program, the 
daily operations of the business must have been controlled by at least one eligible mi­
nority group. Id. Once the city certified the business, it would then qualify to receive 
special consideration in being placed in the pool of minority companies that were guar­
anteed to receive 10% of the total money spent by Denver on construction contracts. 
[d. 
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and practices that appeared to have a negative effect on minority 
groups.293 In addition, statistical disparity studies showed underu­
tilization of minority contractors and that minority businesses were 
less than half as likely to own their own businesses as were whites 
of comparable age and experience.294 Finally, the City of Denver 
introduced anecdotal evidence that included certain instances of ra­
cial and gender epithets, as well as the testimony of a senior vice 
president of a majority-owned construction firm who stated that, 
based on personal experiences, minority firms were judged incom­
petent by non-minority firms.295 
Disagreeing with the Tenth Circuit's finding of a strong basis in 
the evidence, Justice Scalia criticized the court's manifest disregard 
of Croson's requirement that the government actually prove it is 
remedying identified discrimination.296 According to the Tenth Cir­
cuit, Denver must only show that "an inference of past or present 
discrimination could be drawn" from the evidence.297 In addition, 
the Tenth Circuit heightened the showing that the plaintiff must 
make, shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiff" 'to rebut [Den­
ver's] initial showing of the existence of a compelling state inter­
est.' "298 Justice Scalia pointed out the material inconsistency with 
Croson, under which racial preferences cannot be a means to rem­
edy unproven discrimination.299 Scalia argued that it is always the 
government's burden to prove, by a strong basis in the evidence, 
that it is remedying identified discrimination and that there is a 
strong basis in the evidence to conclude that such action is 
necessary.300 
In evaluating the evidence introduced by the City of Denver, 
Justice Scalia pointed out that Denver made the wrong statistical 
comparison by "assum[ingJ that minority firms were on average as 
qualified, willing, and able" to perform the contract.30! Denver did 
not utilize actual bidding data or adjust the raw data via a regres­
293. Id. at 960-61. 
294. Id. at 962-63, 964-65. 
295. Id. at 969. 
296. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1027 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
297. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 321 F.3d at 970. 
298. Id. at 959 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175 
(10th Cir. 2000)). 
299. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc., 540 U.S. at 1030 (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
300. Id. at 1031. 
301. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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sion analysis.302 Justice Scalia also pointed to the unworkability of 
"studies [showing] racial disparities in business formation rates and 
access to capital."303 Such realities can be dealt with by race-neu­
tral measures, including the rigorous enforcement of non-discrimi­
nation laws.304 The fact that Denver continued to use racial 
preferences "for a generation" greatly troubled Justice Scalia.305 
Scalia's primary concern was that the strong-basis-in-the-evi­
dence standard announced in Wygant was being replaced by the 
good-faith reliance paradigm announced in Grutter.306 The Su­
preme Court's acceptance of the Tenth Circuit's inference test, the 
weak showing of evidence, and the lack of a sunset provision after 
Grutter supports this concern. As one judge has noted, "[s]trict 
scrutiny is not what it once was. . .. [I]t has mellowed in recent 
decades."307 If recent precedent is any guide, a state's interest is 
compelling if the state says it is. 
B. Extension of the Diversity Rationale to the Workplace 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the first of two 
courts to apply Grutter's diversity rationale to a public employment 
case.30B In Petit v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed 
whether racial preferences, in the form of artificially increased test 
scores of minorities applying for the rank of sergeant in the Chicago 
Police Department, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.309 
In the mid-1980s the Department issued an examination to 
promote 458 officers to the sergeant rank.310 Of the 3,416 officers 
who took the examination, 2,274 were white, 931 were African 
American and 192 were Hispanic.311 The examination consisted of 
a multiple-choice section, a written short answer component, an 
oral component, and a practical performance evaluation.312 After 
302. [d. at 1031-32. 
303. [d. at 1032. 
304. Id. at 1033. 
305. Id. at 1034. 
306. Id. 
307. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 105 (Cal. 
2004) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004). 
308. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 1074 (2004). 
309. [d. at 1112. 
310. Id. at 1116. 
311. [d. 
312. [d. 
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standardizing the results to eliminate differences in subjective grad­
ing in the oral and short answer portion of the test, the results 
showed that African Americans and Hispanics did not score well 
enough to allow a substantial number of promotions from these ra­
cial groups.313 Of the 458 promotions, the test results would have 
yielded the promotion of only 60 African Americans and 15 His­
panics.314 To balance this inequality, the city upwardly adjusted the 
results for African Americans and Hispanics to "reflect[ ] the score 
a candidate would have received if the test had not had an adverse 
racial impact. "315 Instead of 60 African Americans promoted to the 
sergeant rank, 119 promotions were made, constituting 59 addi­
tional promotions, an increase of 98.3%.316 Similarly, Hispanics re­
ceived 41 promotions instead of 15, resulting in a 273.3% 
increase.317 White officers who were not promoted filed suit in fed­
eral court.318 The district court "granted summary judgment for the 
city based on its claim that the police department had an opera­
tional need to engage in affirmative action and that the action it 
took was narrowly tailored."319 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit set the stage for its approach 
when it stated that it must conduct the analysis in accordance with 
the University of Michigan cases of 2003.320 The court began by 
quoting sections of Grutter, which held that racial diversity is a 
compelling government interest.321 Judge Evans, writing for the 
three-judge panel, noted that Grutter's affirmation of the deference 
given to the University of Michigan could also be applied to the 
Chicago Police Department.322 
Taking Grutter's approach, the court ruled under the rubric of 
operational need that "there is an even more compelling need for 
diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged with protect­
ing a racially ... divided ... city."323 The court adhered to Grutter's 
unorthodox form of strict scrutiny by giving substantial deference 
to the Chicago Police Department's expert witnesses in concluding 
313. Id. 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 1117. 
316. Id. at 1116-17. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 1112. 
319. Id. at 1113. 
320. Id. at 1112. 
321. Id. at 1114. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
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"that affirmative action was warranted to enhance the operations of 
the [Chicago Police Department.]"324 Criminal justice experts, 
based on studies conducted since the 1960s, revealed "that minori­
ties are frequently mistrustful of police and are more willing than 
non-minorities to believe that the police engage in misconduct."325 
In turn, "this lack of confidence ... reduce[s] the willingness of 
some [minority] community members to cooperate with the po­
lice."326 A former chief of police in Oregon noted, and several 
high-ranking members of the Chicago Police Department agreed, 
that diversity at the sergeant rank helps "to influence officers on 
the street," to improve cooperation, and defuse dangerous situ a­
tions.327 The court also stated that the growth of minorities in the 
community must be paralleled at the sergeant rank to earn the com­
munity's trust and, ultimately, enhance the police department's 
ability to prevent and solve crimes.328 Hence, the city concluded, 
and the Seventh Circuit accepted as a compelling interest, that a 
diverse police force would better earn the community's trust and 
better protect Chicago citizens.329 
The Seventh Circuit also found that upwardly adjusting minor­
ity applicants' test scores was narrowly tailored to achieve the goal 
of diversifying the police force.33o In beginning its analysis, the 
court echoed Grutter, which provided that mechanical, predeter­
mined bonuses are unacceptable, yet race used as a plus factor in a 
flexible, non-mechanical manner is constitutionally acceptable.331 
A sunset provision and consideration of the impact of the racial 
preference on members of the majority were essential to the Sev­
enth Circuit's formulation.332 In applying the Paradise factors, the 
court reasoned that the score adjustment used by the Chicago Po­
lice Department met the second prong of strict scrutiny, because 
the city was merely altering the test results to reflect "the score a 
candidate would have received if the test had not had an adverse 
racial impact."333 Additionally, because the test was not validated 
and because the margin of error revealed that the lowest scoring 
324. Id. 
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white candidate and the top scoring black candidate were very 
close, the candidates were both qualified.334 The Seventh Circuit 
further noted that the program ceased after 1991 and the city ade­
quately minimized the harm to the 82 plaintiffs in the action, 50 of 
whom were denied promotion.335 Finally, the Court distinguished 
the twenty-point advantage struck down in the University of Michi­
gan undergraduate case336 and reasoned that the score adjustment 
here could be seen "not as an arbitrary advantage given to the mi­
nority officers, but rather as eliminating an advantage the white of­
ficers had on the test. "337 
The Seventh Circuit again applied the diversity rationale in the 
context of public employment in a 2004 decision concerning promo­
tional opportunities in a Fire Department.338 Biondo v. City of Chi­
cago explored a fact pattern nearly identical to that of Petit.339 
White applicants for promotion were delayed pursuant to an af­
firmative action program; the city defended the program as comply­
ing with federal regulations.34o Judge Williams, in a concurring 
opinion, implied that the city should not only have pled a remedial 
basis for its action, but it should have also pled the operational­
need corollary to the diversity rationale approved in Petit just one 
year earlier.341 Judge Williams noted that a "non remedial reason 
may also constitute a compelling interest supporting the use of race 
and ethnicity in employment decisions."342 
In Lomack v. City ofNewark, a second court applied the diver­
sity rationale in public employment.343 Since 1980, Newark had 
been under a consent decree designed to combat the intentional 
racial discrimination that existed in its fire department.344 The de­
334. Id. 
335. Id. 
336. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
337. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1117-18; see Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (holding that while 
racial diversity is a compelling government interest, a 20-point award to minority appli­
cants in the selection process in the undergraduate division of the University of Michi­
gan was not a narrowly tailored measure to achieve the sought after diversity). 
338. Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004). 
339. ld. 
340. ld. at 683. 
341. ld. at 692 (Williams, J., concurring). The Petit court stated that it was apply­
ing the Grutter diversity model to the public employment area to address the opera­
tional need of a large metropolitan police force. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 
1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004). 
342. Biondo, 382 F.3d at 692. 
343. Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085 (JWB), 2005 WL 2077479, at 
*3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005). 
344. ld. at *1. 
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cree enjoined New Jersey from unlawfully discriminating against 
black or Hispanic fire department employees or applicants with re­
spect to hiring, assignment, training, discipline, promotion, or dis­
charge.345 In 1995, the city authorized two studies examining the 
operation of the consent decree.346 Based on these studies, the city 
concluded that numerous firehouses were racially segregated.347 
For example, one study revealed that of the 108 teams of firefight­
ers, 81 had a majority of white personnel, 15 were predominantly 
black, 1 had a Hispanic majority, while the remaining 11 were inte­
grated.348 In 2002, the mayor ordered city officials to create a de­
partmental personnel transfer system to create 100% diversity.349 
In 2003, Newark announced its new plan of involuntary transfers of 
firefighters across the city, on the basis of race, to diversify the de­
partment and comply with the 1980 consent decree.350 By 2004, the 
city announced that all Newark fire teams had been racially inte­
grated.351 Soon after, white plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that the 
involuntary transfers on the basis of race violated their constitu­
tional rights under the Equal Protection Clause.352 
Surprisingly, the district court chose not to view this matter as 
a reasonable remedial action by a city "operating under a Consent 
Decree to desegregate its fire companies."353 Instead, the court ig­
nored the remedial line of cases and analyzed the controversy as an 
extension of Grutter v. Bollinger.354 The court applied Grutter's 
watered down strict scrutiny to Newark's desegregation policy and 
found that the city had a compelling government interest in attain­
ing a racially diverse fire company.355 The court found that expo­
sure of firefighters to different backgrounds, vocabularies and 
cultures better prepared them to work effectively with colleagues 
and improve performance on tests for promotion.356 In addition, 
the court reasoned that although education is not the primary pur­
pose of a fire company, firefighters spend substantial time in both 
345. Id. 
346. Id 
347. Id. at *2. 
348. Id. 
349. See id. at *3. 
350. See id. at *2-3. 
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formal and informal training, and therefore, racial stereotypes can 
be broken down in the firehouse just as in the classroom.357 The 
court applied Grutter's good-faith deference standard by taking the 
testimony of both a former director and a chief at their word when 
they stated that the camaraderie and tolerance gained by diversify­
ing the fire company would improve the performance of the 
firefighters.358 Finally, after upholding Newark's plan as a constitu­
tionally measured response, thereby passing the narrow tailoring 
prong, the court went on to say that Newark's policy of augmenting 
transfer requests was laudable as well as the "right and just" thing 
to do.359 
Although the diversity model was extended by the Petit and 
Lomack courts in the context of police and fire operations, courts 
have taken the contrary approach in other fields of public employ­
ment.360 Perhaps the clearest expression against expanding the di­
versity rationale to public employment was announced by a federal 
district court in Florida in the context of public contracting.361 In 
Hershill Gill Consulting Engineers v. Miami-Dade County, engi­
neering firms owned by white males challenged participation goals 
ordered under the county's Minority and Women Business Enter­
prise (MWBE) program.362 Based on the Fourteenth Amend­
ment's Equal Protection Clause, the plaintiffs argued that they were 
unlawfully deprived of a fair chance to compete for county con­
tracts because the MWBE program established participation goals 
for granting architectural and engineering contracts to certain mi­
nority contractors.363 "In order to qualify [as a minority business 
under] the MWBE program, a business must [have been] owned 
and controlled by one or more Black, Hispanic or female individ­
ual[], and [had to] have an actual place of business in Miami-Dade 
County."364 African American-operated businesses would receive 
12% and Hispanic operated businesses would receive 25 % of all 
architectural and engineering contracts.365 To achieve these partici­
pation goals, the county used several methods, including set-asides, 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. at *9. 
360. See, e.g., Hershill Gill Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. 
Supp. 2d 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
361. Id. 
362. Id. at 1310. 
363. Id. 
364. Id. at 1312. 
365. Id. 
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subcontractor goals, and bid preferences.366 Bid preferences oper­
ate by "artificially reduc[ing] a MWBE bid by as much as [10%] for 
purposes of determining the lowest bid."367 Although the county 
must revise and review the MWBE program annually, the participa­
tion goals have remained unchanged since 1994, even after a study 
revealed that racial parity was reached between 1996 and 1997.368 
In 2000, the county hired an econometrician to analyze significant 
statistical evidence in an effort to justify the MWBE program's con­
tinued remedial purpose.369 The district court withheld its order 
until after Grutter v. Bollinger was decided and cases interpreting 
Grutter were concluded.370 Significantly, Miami-Dade "argue[d] 
that its affirmative action program [was] in place to remedy past 
and current discrimination in the architectural and engineering in­
dustry."371 What the traditional remedial purpose had to do with 
Grutter's diversity rationale is as unclear. 
Beginning its analysis in a conventional fashion, the district 
court announced that pursuant to A darand , "the applicable stan­
dard for analyzing [the MWBE program was] strict scrutiny."372 
Therefore, "the proponent of [the] racial classification bears the 
burden of proving" a narrowly tailored compelling state interest 
proven by a strong basis in the evidence.373 Next, the court stated 
that the Grutter diversity paradigm did not alter the remedial Equal 
Protection framework.374 The district court concluded that "Grutter 
do[ es] not modify Croson or Adarand in the area of public con­
tracting."375 Nevertheless, Judge Jordan felt that some of Grutter's 
language was helpful in adjudicating the narrow tailoring prong of 
the strict scrutiny analysis.376 
Consequently, after the court found that the county's remedial 
justification was not compelling because it was supported by only 
attenuated and weak evidence, the court engaged in the narrow tai­
loring evaluation.377 Judge Jordan echoed Grutter's caveat that 
366. Id. 
367. Id. 
368. Id. at 1313-14. 
369. Id. at 1315. 
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context matters when reviewing classifications for purposes of equal 
protection inquiry.378 First, as applied to all the MWBE programs, 
many of the minorities who took advantage of the racial prefer­
ences were not actually minorities with respect to their numerical 
composition in the local population.379 Ultimately, the court struck 
down the entire ambit of MWBE programs.380 
The district court then considered the legality of the Hispanic 
Business Enterprise ("HBE") program.381 The district court conse­
quently ruled that the county failed to take into consideration any 
race-neutral alternatives to the HBE program.382 In striking down 
the HBE program, the court found that the indefinite continuation 
of a fixed numerical quota was inconsistent with Grutter's central 
message.383 In operation, courts seem willing to extend Grutter's 
modified narrow tailoring prong to the traditional remedial model 
in public employment cases.384 
C. 	 The Application of Grutter's Reformed Narrow Tailoring 
Analysis 
This subsection details cases in which lower federal courts have 
relied on the traditional remedial justification set forth in the 
CrosonlAdarand line of cases. In addition, it considers the manner 
in which these courts have applied Grutter's deferential narrow tai­
loring analysis. 
In Bullen v. Chaffinich, two master corporals who were denied 
promotions to the rank of sergeant argued that the Governor and 
the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety used racial quotas 
in hiring and promoting state troopers.385 Both officers were eligi­
ble for promotion between October 1, 2001 and December 31, 
2001.386 The test for promotion consisted of two parts: (1) a written 
examination based on material in a textbook; and (2) an oral exami­
nation.387 Only those candidates who passed the written test were 
378. 	 [d. at 1326. 
379. 	 [d. at 1327. 
380. 	 [d. at 1344. 
381. 	 [d. at 1330-31. 
382. 	 [d. 
383. 	 [d. at 1332-33. 
384. W. States Paving Co. v. Wash. State DOT, 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005); Bul­
len v. Chaffinch, No. Civ.A. 02-1315-JJF, 2003 WL 22953222 (D. Del. Dec. 5, 2003). 
385. 	 Bullen, 2003 WL 22953222, at *1. 
386. 	 [d. 
387. 	 [d. 
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eligible to take the oral examination.3B8 The written and oral 
scores, based on evaluations provided by neutral out-of-state police 
officials, were combined to determine the candidate's final score.389 
Next, scores were banded according to standard deviation statistical 
analysis.390 In 1991, the Human Resources Department changed 
the banding method, facilitating higher scores.391 For example, if 
the original model had created an A band with a range of 96-100 
and a B band of 91-95, the new method would have resulted in 
bands beginning at 92.5 and 87.5, respectively.392 The Superinten­
dent instituted promotions based on the new band scores.393 The 
candidates from the highest band were promoted before moving on 
to lower bands.394 
The plaintiffs argued that, beginning in 1998, the Governor and 
the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety had used racial 
quotas in hiring and promoting troopers.395 The former Human 
Resources Director testified that the Secretary had a standing order 
to recruit a particular percentage of minority candidates.396 At 
trial, the plaintiffs presented an e-mail from the Governor to the 
Superintendent.397 The e-mail revealed that the Secretary had or­
dered 30% of trooper recruits be African American.398 Additional 
evidence demonstrated that the Captain of the state police force 
had advised the Superintendent, in writing, that "written references 
should not be made to [the Secretary's] 'direction to hire a class of 
30% African American.' "399 Also admitted into evidence were 
several promotion sheets and internal memos.4OO The promotion 
sheets and internal memos described efforts to increase minority 
representation and contained numerical calculations, broken down 
by race.401 These figures tended to show that altering the standard 
deviation resulted in more African Americans being promoted.402 
388. Id. 
389. Id. at *2. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. 
392. Id. at *2 nn.2-3. 
393. Id. at *2. 
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The jury also considered an Executive Order from the Gover­
nor, issued in response to a Justice Department inquiry, which an­
nounced a plan to increase the number of minorities in the state's 
"workforce to reflect the diversity of the state's population."403 Ev­
idence also showed that the Governor hired an outside consultant 
who recommended placing a freeze on all promotions in order to 
examine aspects of the hiring and promotional practices of the state 
police.404 The plaintiffs argued that this freeze unlawfully pre­
vented their promotions because approximately five vacancies ex­
isted.405 A few months later, the state used a new list of promotions 
and promoted a woman and an African American man.406 The de­
fendant argued that it legitimately delayed filling many of these va­
cancies because of a pressing need to review the operational need 
of the force and its desire to conduct an assessment of the disrup­
tion from a new wave of promotions resulting from the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.407 The jury found for the plaintiffs and 
concluded that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against 
them on the basis of race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifi­
cally, the jury found that the defendants maintained an illegal quota 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.408 
Delaware filed a post-trial motion, arguing that the verdict was 
unsupported by evidence.409 The state claimed that no reasonable 
juror could have found that the defendants maintained an illegal 
quota in the late 1990s and the latter part of 2001.410 Based on 
Grutter's unorthodox narrow tailoring analysis, the district judge 
granted the defendant's motion and overturned the jury verdict.411 
The judge articulated that the state police did not maintain "a pro­
gram in which a certain fixed number or proportion of opportuni­
ties [was] 'reserved exclusively for certain minority groups."'412 
The judge further disregarded the evidence of the e-mail imple­
menting the 30% goal and ruled that even though "race was a sub­
stantial and motivating factor," and "attempts were made by 
403. Id. at *3. 
404. Id. at *4. 
405. Id. at *5. 
406. Id. at *4. 
407. Id. at *5-6. 
408. See Bullen v. Chaffinch 336 F.Supp. 2d 342, 347 (D. Del. 2004). 
409. Id. 
410. Id. 
411. Id. at 348. 
412. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335 (2003)). 
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Defendants to manipulate the promotional process" to achieve mi­
nority representation, an illegal quota did not exist.413 Finally, the 
judge stated, in dicta, that such generalized aggressive efforts to 
achieve equal opportunity were admirable.414 
A 2005 decision from the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar is­
sue. In Western States Paving Co. v. Washington State Department 
of Transportation, the court considered whether the Transportation 
Equity Act for the 21st Century's (TEA-21) authorization of racial 
preferences in federally funded contracts violated the Equal Protec­
tion Clause.415 The plaintiff, a subcontractor, submitted bids for 
two local paving projects.416 The prime contractor was bound by 
TEA-21's minority utilization requirement mandating 14% minor­
ity participation.417 Therefore, despite Western Paving's substan­
tially lower bids, the general contractor awarded the subcontracts to 
minority-owned firms.418 
Congress passed TEA-21 based on evidence of past discrimina­
tion in the transportation contracting industry.419 Enacted in 1998, 
TEA-21 provided race and sex-based contracting preferences.42o 
The statute provided that, except as the Secretary of Transportation 
otherwise determined, "not less than 10 percent of the amounts 
made available ... shall be expended with small business concerns 
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals. "421 The corresponding regulations identified blacks, 
Hispanics, Asian Americans, Native Americans and women as so­
cially and economically disadvantaged.422 However, a safety net 
provided that wealthy minorities could be disqualified while poor 
non-minority contractors could be included in the program.423 The 
regulations explained that the 10% minority utilization requirement 
was "aspirational in nature"; it could be tweaked by each individual 
state and should only be used after attempting race-neutral alterna­
tives.424 The regulations also provided a two-step process for apply­
413. Id. 
414. Id. 
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ing race-conscious measures.425 After calculating the relative 
availability of minority firms in the local industry, the figure was 
adjusted to reflect their proven capacity to perform the requisite 
work.426 
The court applied the traditional CrosonlAdarand remedial 
framework, stating that racial "'classifications are constitutional 
only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling 
governmental interests.' "427 Unlike the Tenth Circuit's good-faith 
burden-shifting paradigm of Concrete Works of Coiorado,428 the 
Ninth Circuit stated that it must determine whether the United 
States has shown by a "strong basis in the evidence" that TEA-21 
satisfies strict scrutiny's exacting requirement that "remedial action 
was necessary. "429 
In analyzing the facial challenge, the court found that the fed­
eral government had shown it had a strong basis in the evidence 
that discrimination in the transportation industry warranted reme­
dial action.430 The Ninth Circuit applied Grutter's modified narrow 
tailoring analysis after quoting the Paradise factors.431 First, the 
court noted that TEA-21 did not establish an unconstitutional 
quota because it only required a good-faith compliance effort.432 
The Ninth Circuit ruled that unlike the 30% set-aside created in 
Croson, the aspirational contracting goal of 10% provides the state 
with a flexible system that adequately comports with narrow tailor­
ing mandates.433 Ultimately, the court reasoned that each state 
could set "minority utilization goal[ s] that reflect[ ed] the realities of 
[the state's] own labor market."434 Next, the court cited Grutter's 
requirement that while each conceivable race-neutral alternative 
need not be exhausted, a good-faith consideration of race-neutral 
alternatives must be implemented.435 Due to TEA-21's preference 
that race-neutral measures be considered, the court found this fac­
tor was met despite the lack of actual implementation of race-neu­
425. Id. at 989. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. at 990 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995». 
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tral measures.436 Finally, the court decided that the burden placed 
on white contractors who lost projects to minority contractors who 
submitted higher bids did not itself invalidate TEA-21's racial pref­
erence program.437 The court reasoned that otherwise, all affirma­
tive action plans would be unconstitutiona1.438 As the decisions 
from the Delaware district court and the Ninth Circuit illustrate, 
federal courts are willing to extend Grutter's liberalized narrow tai­
loring analysis to racial-preference cases in the employment arena. 
v. THE FUTURE OF THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE AND 
CONTEXTUAL STRICT SCRUTINY IN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
A. Reading The Tea Leaves: Predictions and Analysis 
The remedial framework laid out in the Croson!Adarand line 
of cases is likely to stay in control of the public contracting sector, 
as none of Grutter's foundational reasoning logically applies to gov­
ernment contracting, including public works and defense con­
tracting. A three-tiered analysis facilitates the inquiry into 
Grutter's potential outgrowth to public employment. The first tier 
looks at important emanations from the remedial line of affirmative 
action cases, ranging from Wygant in 1986 to Adarand in 1995. The 
second tier examines the textual indicators from the Grutter major­
ity. The third tier evaluates the lower federal courts' interpretation 
of Grutter's diversity rationale in public employment cases. 
1. Remedial Line of Affirmative Action Cases 
On balance, the Croson! Adarand line of cases does not 
strongly indicate that the Grutter diversity justification will expand 
to public employment. First, the remedial line of cases has estab­
lished traditional strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review of 
governmental racial classifications in all contexts.439 More impor­
tant, the only compelling government interest that a majority of the 
High Court has agreed upon is remedying the effects of past or pre­
sent de jure discrimination.440 The Justice whose opinions provide 
the clearest insight into how the Supreme Court might address the 
436. See id. at 993-94. 
437. Id. at 995. 
438. Id. 
439. See supra text accompanying note 271. 
440. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986); see Hiller v. 
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diversity argument in employment cases has recently retired. In her 
Wygant concurrence, Justice O'Connor suggested that a non-reme­
dial paradigm encouraging racial diversity could emerge in public 
employment.441 Yet, in her Metro Broadcasting dissent, Justice 
O'Connor rejected the notion that creating racial diversity in public 
broadcasting was a compelling government interest, and articulated 
that modern Equal Protection jurisprudence has recognized only 
the remedial model as satisfying the initial prong of strict scru­
tiny.442 Not only did Justice O'Connor waffle on the possibility of a 
non-remedial justification, she also fluctuated on the strictness with 
which strict scrutiny review would be applied.443 Importantly, it 
was her swing vote that decided both Adarand in 1995 and Grutter 
in 2003. Without Justice O'Connor on the bench, it is hard to pre­
dict what value the remedial line of cases will have on future 
jurisprudence. 
While the block of the four more liberal Justices on the Court 
seem likely to accept the concept of creating diversity at the work­
place as compelling, only Justice Stevens has stated his beliefs on 
paper.444 Concurring in Croson, Justice Stevens wrote that cor­
recting the effects of past discrimination should not be the only 
compelling government interest and hinted that creating racial di­
versity could be an effective governmental purpose.44S Despite the 
uncertainty left by Justice O'Connor's departure, the remedial line 
of cases is, at the very least, neutral; at most, it fails to indicate that 
Grutter's diversity rationale will expand into public employment 
cases. Grutter's textual emanations are, however, more indicative. 
2. Textual Emanations 
The Grutter opinion begins by articulating the good-faith com­
pelling state interest analysis, providing the caveat that not every 
decision based on race is equally objectionable and that context 
matters when reviewing such c1assifications.446 Grutter establishes a 
441. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text accompa­
nying notes 133-37. 
442. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990), overruled by Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see supra text accompanying notes 242­
50. 
443. See supra text accompanying notes 242-50. 
444. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469, 512-13 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see supra text accompanying notes 
204-06. 
445. See supra text accompanying notes 204-06. 
446. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003). 
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case-by-case approach in which the court might consider racial pref­
erences in public employment. The Court further stated that reme­
dying past discrimination is not the "only governmental use of race 
that can survive strict scrutiny."447 This statement presents another 
rationale that would, at least in principle, allow consideration of di­
versity at the public workplace. 
The Court provided two stronger signals that indicate the po­
tential for expansion. First, the majority noted that the "[e]ffective 
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic 
life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, 
is to be realized."448 Although this was dicta, the question that re­
mains is whether the statement is merely an ethical aspiration or 
whether it propounds a future constitutional mandate. Second, Jus­
tice O'Connor noted that a diverse workforce benefits major Amer­
ican businesses, many of whom have indicated that the skills 
needed in today's global economy can only be developed through 
exposure to diverse peoples and viewpoints.449 Justice O'Connor 
even pointed to the U.S. Armed Forces as an example of the neces­
sity and effect of racial diversity.450 
However, the textual indicators against expansion of the diver­
sity rationale are more telling. The unprecedented good-faith ap­
plication of strict scrutiny coupled with the non-remedial diversity 
model in Grutter was based on the uniqueness of the educational 
judgment of academic institutions.451 Therefore, a crucial part of 
the Court's holding was "in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within 
constitutionally prescribed limits. "452 It was through this educa­
tional courtesy that the Court departed from the traditional reme­
dial justification and ruled that racial diversity is a compelling 
government interest.453 Another important textual indicator 
against expansion is that the diversity rationale is primarily based 
upon "break[ing] down racial stereotypes" and making classroom 
discussions "more spirited."454 
In contrast, the government as an employer, whose purpose is 
447. Id. at 328. 
448. Id. at 332. 
449. Id. at 330-3l. 
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to provide the efficient operation of essential services, functions in 
a manifestly different capacity than the government as an educator. 
It is attenuated to argue that breaking down stereotypes through 
the process of intentionally giving preferences to minorities so that 
they may bring a new perspective into the world debate improves 
the durability of the pavement in a road, the accuracy of a missile 
defense system, or the effectiveness of a fire department. Inten­
tionally discriminating against individuals on the basis of race, in 
the name of diversity, is not justified when the tasks at hand are 
tangible and not pedagogical. Ultimately, Grutter's reasoning does 
not logically extend to realizing the benefits of learning about dif­
ferent races and livening discussion in the employment context. 
The Court noted that the admissions policy at the University of 
Michigan was implemented to prepare students for work and that 
the "path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented and quali­
fied individuals of [all races]."455 A reasoned inference from these 
particular statements is that while the High Court was tolerant of 
racial preferences in the university context, it may be less enthusias­
tic in the employment field. While affirmative action serves an ini­
tial purpose of leveling the playing field at the formative level, the 
Court implies that once the basic path is laid, the Court will be less 
tolerant in the employment context where the goals and obligations 
are fundamentally different. Even though the text and purpose of 
Grutter point against expansion of the pure diversity justification, 
the lower federal courts have taken it upon themselves to chart a 
slightly different path.456 
3. Interpretation by the Federal Courts 
While a limited number of courts have actually applied the di­
versity justification, others have employed a less rigorous narrow 
tailoring analysis in the public employment context. Only two 
courts, so far, have expressly applied Grutter's diversity model to an 
employment case. The first case was Petit, which involved the oper­
ational needs of the Chicago Police Force.457 Some commentators 
point to Petit as an important indication of the lower courts' willing­
ness to extend Grutter's diversity justification.458 Nevertheless, 
455. Id. at 331-32. 
456. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 541 U.S. 1074 (2004); Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085, 2005 WL 
2077479, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005). 
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once Petit's surface is scratched, the reality beneath speaks not of 
diversity but of public safety. By pairing African American author­
ities with African American neighborhoods and Hispanic authori­
ties with Hispanic neighborhoods, Petit did not address diversity, 
but homogeneity. Petit, therefore, is not a logical extension of 
Grutter's diversity paradigm. Instead, Petit applied an operational­
need corollary to the diversity rationale; such a justification should 
simply be called the public safety exception. 
Grutter's holding, that diversity is a compelling government in­
terest, was specifically based on the notion that diversity "helps to 
break down racial stereotypes," facilitates understanding of differ­
ent races, enlightens, creates more spirited dialogue, and better 
prepares students as professionals.459 In contrast, Petit's holding 
and accompanying rationale were more about division than diver­
sity. The Seventh Circuit, in essence, sees a compelling state inter­
est in sending African American authorities into African American 
neighborhoods and Hispanic authorities into Hispanic neighbor­
hoods because African Americans better relate to African Ameri­
cans and Hispanics better relate to Hispanics.460 This arrangement 
better diffuses criminal encounters between minorities and police 
and prevents future crimes.461 
Ironically, the Chicago police force approach appears to follow 
Professor Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis.462 Bell's thesis 
states that American law was founded on white, Eurocentric under­
standing and power,463 and that minority progress occurs only when 
advancing the interests of minorities is in the best interest of the 
majority.464 If the operational need to diversify the sergeant rank 
claimed by the Chicago police force affirms the notion that only 
officials and citizens of the same race can best relate to one another 
to control public safety, then the operational-need justification is 
wholly antithetical to Grutter's diversity rationale. If Chicago 
wanted to employ the pure diversity rationale, as described in Grut-
Action in Employment, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 451, 460 (2004); Michael L. Fore­
man, Kristin M. Dadey & Audrey J. Wiggins, The Continuing Relevance of Race-Con­
scious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the Nation's Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 81, 103-04 (2004). 
459. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
460. See supra text accompanying notes 325-29. 
461. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1074 (2004). 
462. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 47 (5th ed. 2004). 
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ter, it would have implemented a plan to integrate the different 
races of police sergeants and officers so the officers from repre­
sented races would learn about the socio-economic heritage of 
other officers to promote better cooperation within the local com­
munity. White officers would learn from minority officers to enable 
white officers to stand alone in a minority neighborhood, and vice 
versa. 
Incidentally, Newark, New Jersey did apply the integration ap­
proach in Lomack v. City of Newark.465 Nevertheless, Lomack's 
application of the diversity rationale was seriously flawed. First, the 
court expressly refused to see Lomack for the desegregation case 
that it plainly was.466 While the court noted that the involuntary 
transfer plan was designed to effectuate the remedial purpose of the 
consent decree, it applied Grutter's non-remedial diversity ratio­
nale.467 The diversity justification is not remedial in any sense. 
Hence, the court in Lomack erred by confusing these two distinct 
constitutional frameworks. The city should have prevailed under 
the desegregation line of cases, modeled after the busing cases of 
the 1960s, or in the alternative, the court should have applied the 
Crosonl Adarand jurisprudence, which is grounded in the employ­
ment context. Under the CrosonlAdarand line of jurisprudence, 
transfers would be legitimate if they were undertaken to effectuate 
the remedial purpose of the consent decree.468 Instead, the district 
court forced the education-based diversity rationale into an em­
ployment context where it did not apply. 
Despite Petit and Lomack, the distinct functions served by ed­
ucation and employment indicate that an expansion of the diversity 
rationale is unlikely, especially on higher levels of review. Inten­
tionally hiring sergeants of a certain race to facilitate minority coop­
eration with police, or laying pipe under an interstate highway, have 
nothing to do with improving learning through diversity. The dis­
trict court in Hershill Gill agreed.469 In that case, when participa­
tion goals were set for minority firms in the context of construction 
465. Lomack v. City of Newark, No. Civ.A.04-6085, 2005 WL 2077479, at *3 
(D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005) (holding that achieving racial diversity within the Newark, N.J. 
Fire Department is a compelling government interest because exposure of firefighters 
to different backgrounds and vocabularies better prepares firefighters to work effec­
tively with colleagues and improve performance on promotional exams). 
466. Id. at *4. 
467. Id. at *6. 
468. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476 (1989); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995). 
469. See supra text accompanying notes 362-86. 
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projects, the court stated that the Grutter diversity model did "not 
modify Croson or Adarand in the area of public contracting. "470 At 
least in the view of this particular court, the diversity rationale did 
not apply to public contracting cases and, therefore, remedial cases 
are unaffected by Grutter.471 
However, the diversity rationale could conceivably be applica­
ble in the context of university professorships.472 A logical link be­
tween Grutter's diversity reasoning and enhancing learning 
outcomes through exposure to people of different races applies to 
professors' interactions with students, and to the level of discourse 
among students.473 Classroom discussion is livened by diversity of 
professors, thereby increasing the number of cultural views por­
trayed to students.474 Public school systems may also argue that 
racial diversity is as important in elementary and secondary schools 
as it is in Universities because it better prepares students for higher 
education. 
Overall, lower courts have readily extended Grutter's liberal­
ized narrow tailoring analysis to the traditional remedial line of 
cases. This approach includes acceptance of the critical mass or 
unannounced range model, as accepted in Bullen and Western States 
Paving. Other examples include a less exhaustive consideration of 
race-neutral alternatives, tolerating a larger threshold of an accept­
able burden on the majority, and possibly the lack of a sunset provi­
sion. In addition, it is plausible that courts could continue in the 
footsteps of the Tenth and Seventh Circuits and water down the 
strict scrutiny analysis by giving substantial deference to the gov­
ernment's position that affirmative action serves a compelling gov­
ernment interest in certain circumstances. Perhaps some courts will 
extend the diversity rationale to employment cases in an effort to 
uphold suspect racial preference plans. 
In Petit, the Seventh Circuit kept in line with Grutter's good­
faith standard when it gave deference to the views of Chicago po­
lice experts who concluded that racial preferencing used to enhance 
diversity of the force was essential to carrying out operations.475 
470. Hershill Gill Consulting Eng'rs v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. Supp. 2d 
1305,1317 (S.D. Fla. 2004). 
471. Id. 
472. Suzanne E. Eckes, Diversity in Higher Education: The Consideration ofRace 
in Hiring University Faculty, 2005 BYU Eouc. & L.J. 33, 48 (2005). 
473. Id. 
474. Id. at 49. 
475. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111,1114-15 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
541 U.S. 1074 (2004). 
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This action is directly analogous to the Supreme Court's approach 
in Grutter. There, the Court used strict scrutiny as the appropriate 
level of review, but took the University of Michigan at its word that 
creating racial diversity was a compelling interest put in place to 
improve learning outcomes and break down stereotypes.476 In ad­
dition, the three Supreme Court Justices who dissented from denial 
of certiorari in Concrete Works of Colorado v. Denver questioned 
the Tenth Circuit's approach to the remedial diversity justifica­
tion.477 The Tenth Circuit merely required that Denver demon­
strate that an inference of discrimination could be drawn from the 
evidence, as opposed to Wygant's more stringent requirement that 
the government show a "strong basis in evidence."478 
With a material change in the composition of the Supreme 
Court, however, the Grutter decision itself, and perhaps all affirma­
tive action programs in the United States, are just one vote away 
from being stricken from American constitutional jurisprudence. If 
Chief Justice Roberts mirrors former Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote 
and Justice Alito becomes the swing vote, the Court would have the 
5-4 majority required to overturn Grutter. A narrow interpretation 
of "compelling government interest" in education cases would 
make it extremely difficult to advance or protect constitutional lib­
erties on account of race. Benign discrimination, and the concept 
that the moral appropriateness of intentional discrimination 
changes by altering the color of the beneficiary, would end. 
Nevertheless, the probable short-term outcome is more re­
strained. The Court will likely employ a case-by-case approach, 
where stare decisis is well respected and fundamental changes in 
the law occur more incrementally. In the near future, Grutter will 
remain fundamentally intact or perhaps slightly modified. Yet even 
under Grutter, the non-remedial diversity rationale is only mini­
mally susceptible to expansion into public employment. It is likely 
that the Supreme Court will be hesitant to apply the diversity ratio­
nale to most public employment contexts. 
B. The Supreme Court and Judicial Politics 
With Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito confirmed, affirm­
ative action stands to be limited or perhaps functionally eradicated. 
Based on the new Justices' jurisprudential temperament, it is un­
476. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
477. 540 U.S. 1027, 1029 (2003). 
478. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,277-78 (1986). 
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likely that they will support the non-remedial racial diversity para­
digm announced in Grutter. It is therefore conceivable that Chief 
Justice Roberts, along with Justice Alito, could return the razor­
sharp teeth back to strict scrutiny review. As a result, it is unlikely 
that Grutter will extend into public employment. 
A snapshot of Roberts's approach to Equal Protection issues is 
revealed in an amicus brief he wrote in support of The Associated 
General Contractors of America for Adarand Constructors v. 
Mineta. 479 The 2001 Supreme Court case analyzed the constitution­
ality of the TEA-21 statute that provided for racial preferences in 
federal contracting projects.480 In his brief, Roberts took a hard 
line approach to Wygant's strong-basis-in-the-evidence requirement 
and argued that Congress lacked the specific findings to support the 
compelling interest behind the asserted remedial purpose of the 
statute.481 Roberts also highlighted that simple legislative pro­
nouncements of good faith that lack specific findings regarding the 
industry to which the preference is applied, cannot suffice.482 
Roberts's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
however, revealed a more measured view of affirmative action.483 
For example, Roberts stated that he understood the current Court 
to permit "[c]onsideration of race or ethnic background, so long as 
it's not ... a make-or-break test."484 Roberts also expressed his 
view that the Supreme Court adequately considered the impact of 
affirmative action when it upheld the race-conscious admissions 
program at the University of Michigan Law Schoo1.485 In an ex­
change with Senator Diane Feinstein, Roberts articulated that "ef­
forts to ensure the full participation in all aspects of our society by 
people, without regard to their race, ethnicity, gender, religious be­
liefs, all of those are efforts that I think are appropriate."486 Fi­
479. Brief for The Associated General Contractors of America as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001) (No. 00­
730). 
480. Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103, 105-06 (2001). 
481. Brief for The Associated General Contractors of America, supra note 479, at 
7-13. 
482. Id. at 9. 
483. Greg Stohr & Robert Schmidt, Roberts Gives Hints on Property, Race, Death 
Penalty (Update 3), Sept. 14,2005, http://www.bloomberg.comJapps/news?pid=10000l03 
&sid=AGjJjznR_R6Y &refer= US. 
484. TopNews.com, Text of John Roberts Hearing 5, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www. 
wtopnews.comJindex.php?nid=343&sid=570126. 
485. Id. 
486. SFGate.com, Text of John Roberts Hearing-19, Sept. 14, 2005, http://sfgate. 
comJcgi-biniarticle.cgi?f=lN/al2005/09/13/nationaUw194051D18.DTL. 
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nally, Roberts noted that "a measured effort that can withstand 
scrutiny is ... a very positive approach."487 
Justice Alito's position on affirmative action is more evident. 
On his application to work under Attorney General Meese during 
the Reagan Administration, Alito wrote, "I am particularly proud 
of my contribution in recent cases in which the government has ar­
gued in the Supreme Court that racial and ethnic quotas should not 
be allowed and that the Constitution does not protect a right to an 
abortion. "488 Alito noted that he believes" 'very strongly in limited 
government, federalism, free enterprise, the supremacy of the 
elected branches of government ... and the legitimacy of a govern­
ment role in protecting traditional values."'489 
Although Alito has not written an opinion on affirmative ac­
tion in the Fourteenth Amendment context, he voted to strike 
down an affirmative action program under Title VII, while the 
Third Circuit was sitting en banc in 1996.490 In Taxman v. Board of 
Education of the Township of Piscataway, the Board, faced with a 
budget crisis, fired Ms. Taxman, a white teacher with equal seniority 
to a black teacher, to achieve racial diversity on the faculty pursu­
ant to an affirmative action program.491 The en banc majority, 
joined by Judge Alito, held that under Title VII, affirmative action 
plans must have a remedial purpose to be upheld.492 Thus, Judge 
Alito signed on to the notion that, given the clear language of Title 
VII, "a non-remedial affirmative action plan, even one with a laud­
able purpose, cannot pass muster."493 In light of the new Justices' 
conservative approach to affirmative action, it appears unlikely that 
they will support an extension of the non-remedial diversity ratio­
nale to public employment. 
CONCLUSION 
It is proper to ask" '[w]hether America's public policy effec­
487. Id. 
488. Bill Sammon, Alito Rejected Abortion as a Right, THE WASH. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2005, at A01. 
489. Id. (quoting Samuel Alito's application for appointment as Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General). 
490. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). 
491. Id. at 1550-52. 
492. Id. at 1557. 
493. Id. at 1550. 
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tively fights historical discrimination by practicing it."'494 The di­
versity regime has placed the nation in a "paradox which is that we 
are trying to eradicate the historically invidious effects of race [dis­
crimination] with a process that institutionalizes race as the basis 
for college admissions [and] faculty hiring [decisions]."495 Courts 
should find that diversity is not a compelling government interest 
under the Equal Protection Clause because it perpetuates affirma­
tive entitlements. Above all, the negative liberties embodied within 
the individual protections of the Constitution should be shields to 
be used for defense rather than swords designed for attack. 
The central issue is the relationship between negative liberty 
and affirmative rights. The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment were added to our Constitution to ensure that the 
state would not engage in the arbitrary exercise of power, a corner­
stone of the oppression experienced under the English Crown.496 
The negative liberties enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment are 
in place to ensure the survival of the fundamental values of fair 
order learned from both Lockean enlightenment philosophy and 
the Republic's ongoing journey in order to prevent the abuse of 
power. The Fourteenth Amendment should protect citizens from 
official oppression, but the Amendment should not provide a cate­
gorical right to privileged entitlements based on race, when the citi­
zen has suffered no de jure discrimination. Hence, the only 
justification that arguably fits within the text and purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is the remedial model recognized in the 
CrosoniAdarand line of cases. Under the remedial model, a reme­
dial program is constitutional where there is proof that discrimina­
tion committed by the state caused the harm that will be 
remedied.497 Above all, it is imperative to recognize that the mo­
rality of intentional racial discrimination does not change by revers­
ing the colors of the perpetrator or beneficiary. The same wrong 
drives both discrimination and its remedy. 
In the employment context, diversity proponents would try to 
supplement Grutter's reasoning with the justification of a represen­
tative bureaucracy. In the literal sense, a representative bureau­
cracy is "a civil service in which every race, caste, or social class of 
persons in a nation are represented in exact or roughly proportional 
494. Dinesh D'Souza, Affirmative Action Debate: Should Race Based Affirmative 
Action be Abandoned as a National Policy?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 425, 429 (1996). 
495. Id. 
496. EpSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 23, at 630-31. 
497. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). 
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numbers to its makeup in the overall population."498 This approach 
values the social equity achieved through racial diversity above the 
standards of efficiency and individual rights. In short, the represen­
tative bureaucracy is designed to generate a workforce that is 
broadly characteristic of the society in which it functions, so people 
of authority can better relate and, hence, service the corresponding 
racial segments of the citizenry.499 Yet, proponents fail to consider 
efficiency. The government should demand the best possible em­
ployees, for the best possible team in order to achieve efficient op­
erations in its conceived purpose of servicing the citizenry. Several 
reviews have found that there is no clear economic case for 
diversity.50o 
Supporters of affirmative action and diversity reason that ra­
cism is omnipresent in American society.50l A recent article argues 
that more than fifty years after Brown and more than thirty years of 
racial preferences have simply not been enough time for minorities 
to attain meaningful socio-economic achievement in the profes­
sional sphere.502 This approach focuses on the disparate impact 
theory, which states that disparities between whites and minorities 
in employment rates, in themselves, warrant racial preference 
plans.503 
The diversity proponents vilify the shameful role race has 
played in the past, yet wish to re-institutionalize the same disgrace­
ful regime today. While the African American story indeed depicts 
a long and arduous struggle for liberty, the possibility of disciplining 
those responsible is impossible. Discriminating against innocent 
members of the majority further splits the racial chasm. Enlighten­
ment philosophy teaches that individuals are free until they actually 
hurt another or interfere with another's liberty. The stringent en­
forcement of anti-discrimination laws preserves the proper balance 
498. David Nachmias & David H. Rosenbloom, Measuring Bureaucratic Repre­
sentation and Integration, in DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SERVICE 
40 (Walter D. Broadnax ed., 2000). 
499. See Lloyd G. Nigro, A Mini-Symposium, Affirmative Action in Public Em­
ployment, in DIVERSITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN PUBLIC SERVICE 160-61 (Walter 
D. Broadnax ed., 2000). 
500. See Stephan Overell, An issue that is not black and white: Corporate Diver­
sity: Is there really a business case for having a diverse workforce?, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Feb. 21, 2005, at 11; Donna Howell, Work Force of the 21st Century: Is there a pot of 
gold at the end of the diversity rainbow for large corporations?, INVESTORS BUSINESS 
DAILY, June 20, 2005, at AlO. 
501. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 458, at 112-13. 
502. Id. at 104-05. 
503. Id. at 83-84. 
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of liberty and equity. The equal protection of all must not be re­
placed with the unequal protection of some. 
A social order that penalizes those who do well in their profes­
sional endeavors is a symptom of a dysfunctional culture. We 
should aspire to live up to one of the most fundamental principles 
of the civil rights movement, which was capsulized by the Reverend 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., when he espoused his hope that Ameri­
cans wish to "[l]ive in a nation where they will not be judged by the 
color of their skin but by the content of their character. "504 Conse­
quently, the next time the opportunity emerges to halt the progress 
of racial preferences into the public employment context, we, in the 
spirit of Odysseus, should remain faithful to the rule of law as en­
shrined in the federal constitution by leaning on and rowing hard. 
504. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream Speech delivered at the Lincoln 
Memorial (August 28, 1963) (transcript available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ 
speeches/lhaveadream.htm). 
